Brown v. Jacobsen Land & Cattle Co., 900 N.W.2d 765

Jacobsen owned Banner County land; Brown alleged ~80 acres of Jacobsen’s land had been fenced with and acquired by Brown via adverse possession and filed a quiet title action and recorded a lis pendens before Jacobsen closed a sale.
Jacobsen executed and recorded a warranty deed conveying the disputed parcel to the Nebraska Game and Parks Commission (the State) after Brown recorded the lis pendens.
The State moved to intervene, alleging it held equitable title via the purchase agreement and sought to defend the property interest; the district court allowed intervention over Brown’s objection.
The district court held (on partial summary judgment) the lis pendens made the State a “subsequent purchaser” and limited its rights; Jacobsen withdrew from participation and did not appear at trial.
At pretrial the court ruled the State could not present evidence on the adverse-possession claim because its rights were limited by lis pendens; Brown tried the case unopposed and prevailed.
The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, holding an intervenor who is a subsequent purchaser is nonetheless a party entitled to fully participate and offer evidence in the quiet title action.

Issue	Brown (Plaintiff)	State (Intervenor/Defendant)	Held
Does recording lis pendens make a later grantee (State) a "subsequent purchaser"?	Lis pendens was properly recorded; later grantee is a subsequent purchaser.	Conceded that lis pendens was recorded but argued status should not bar participation.	Yes — the State was a subsequent purchaser under §25-531.
If the State is a subsequent purchaser, may it intervene and fully defend (offer evidence) in the quiet title action?	Subsequent purchaser should be bound and not "stand in the shoes" of the original owner to attack adverse possession.	As intervenor and party, the State argued it must be allowed to defend its interests and offer evidence.	The court held intervention makes the State a party with all party rights; lis pendens does not bar offering evidence.
Did the district court err by excluding the State’s evidence at trial based solely on lis pendens status?	Exclusion proper because lis pendens limited later grantee’s defensive rights.	Exclusion improper; lis pendens is procedural and does not restrict party defenses.	Error — exclusion unfairly prejudiced the State; reversal and remand for new trial.
Was cancellation of lis pendens required or considered?	Brown did not move to cancel; court found lis pendens valid.	State contended lis pendens could be canceled but did not seek relief below.	No relief because State did not request cancellation below; appellate court will not consider unraised trial-court issues.

Kelliher v. Soundy, 288 Neb. 898 (interpreting lis pendens and statutory construction)
Hadley v. Corey, 137 Neb. 204 (discussing lis pendens effect and rights of subsequent purchasers)
Munger v. Beard & Bro., 79 Neb. 764 (holding plaintiffs must join known parties with interests; lis pendens does not bar parties from being litigated)
Kirchner v. Gast, 169 Neb. 404 (intervention makes one a party with rights of a party)
Poullos v. Pine Crest Homes, 293 Neb. 115 (standard of review in equity/quiet title appeals)