Brown v. Dist. of Columbia, 928 F.3d 1070

Background

Plaintiffs are a certified class of D.C. Medicaid beneficiaries who have resided in nursing facilities for 90+ days, are eligible for community-based services, wish to live in the community, and need D.C. transition assistance to do so.
Plaintiffs sued under Title II of the ADA and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act seeking an injunction requiring a system of transition assistance and numerical placement targets; litigation began in 2010 and proceeded to class certification and a bifurcated bench trial (liability first).
The district court found at the liability phase that plaintiffs failed to prove a "concrete, systemic deficiency" in D.C.’s transition services, and that the asserted injuries were not redressable by a single injunction, and entered judgment for the District.
The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding the district court applied the wrong legal framework: Olmstead does not require plaintiffs to identify a "concrete, systemic deficiency" as an element; instead the inquiry focuses on whether requested accommodations are reasonable under Olmstead and who bears the burden to prove the fundamental-alteration defense.
The panel held that the State (District) bears the burden to show that accommodations are unreasonable — either by proving an adequate "Olmstead Plan" (comprehensive, effectively working plan with a waiting list that moves at a reasonable pace) or by proving individual requested accommodations would fundamentally alter/require an unreasonable reallocation of resources.
The court remanded for further proceedings applying the correct burdens: plaintiffs need only establish the Olmstead prima facie showing and proposed reasonable accommodations; the District must then prove the Olmstead defense (adequate plan or undue burden/cost), and the district court may modify/decertify the class if common proof cannot resolve the reasonableness question for all class members.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiffs must identify a "concrete, systemic deficiency" to prevail under Olmstead	Brown: No; Olmstead requires showing institutionalization when community placement is appropriate and not opposed, and that requested accommodations are reasonable	District: Plaintiffs must prove a concrete systemic policy/practice causing classwide institutionalization to obtain classwide relief	Held: Plaintiffs need not prove a standalone "concrete, systemic deficiency"; court must apply Olmstead framework and place burden on the State to prove unreasonableness/fundamental alteration
Burden of proof on fundamental-alteration (reasonableness) defense	Brown: Once plaintiffs make prima facie showing, the State must prove accommodations would be unreasonable/fundamentally alter services	District: Plaintiffs should shoulder burden to prove systemic deficiency and causation for classwide relief	Held: District bears burden to show requested accommodations are unreasonable — either via an adequate Olmstead Plan or by proving each requested injunction provision would be so costly/unreasonable as to require reallocating resources from others
Rule 23 commonality and (b)(2) class propriety	Brown: Class certification is proper because common questions (Olmstead Plan adequacy; cost/unreasonableness of remedies) can yield classwide answers and a single injunction can increase opportunity for community placement	District: The case lacks common proof to generate common answers and a single injunction cannot remedy each member's situation	Held: Class certification is acceptable on current record; common proof can resolve the threshold Olmstead questions, and a (b)(2) injunction that improves odds for all members suffices even if not 100% effective
Proper causation standard for Olmstead claims	Brown: Plaintiffs sufficiently show prima facie causation by showing appropriateness and desire for community placement; question whether "but-for" or "motivating-factor" governs remains	District: Plaintiffs must prove but-for causation (institutionalization would not have occurred but for the District’s policies)	Held: Majority directs remand on causation without setting a single rule; concurrence advocates a Price Waterhouse–style burden-shifting approach: plaintiffs show motivating-factor; District may then prove lack of but-for causation to rebut liability

Key Cases Cited

Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (plurality establishes ADA integration mandate and describes State defenses including an "Olmstead Plan")
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (commonality requires common questions capable of classwide resolution)
DL v. District of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (discussing class-commonality post-Wal-Mart; later decisions refining subclasses)
DL v. District of Columbia, 860 F.3d 713 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (upholding subclass certification where common proof yields common answers)
Steimel v. Wernert, 823 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 2016) (discusses State burden to prove fundamental alteration defense)
Townsend v. Quasim, 328 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2003) (State must show community placement would fundamentally alter services)
Frederick L. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare of Pa., 422 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2005) (integration mandate qualified by fundamental-alteration defense)
Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018) (finding that factual findings based on incorrect burden cannot stand)