Brown v. Commonwealth
2013 Ky. LEXIS 637
| Ky. | 2013Background
- On August 17–18, 2010 Kenneth Brown agreed to sell eight pounds of marijuana to David Curd; during a meeting Brown fled a vehicle after an unexpected passenger (Lashawn Talbert) pulled a gun; Brown then fired multiple shots, Talbert later died.
- Brown was indicted on murder, two counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, tampering with physical evidence, and trafficking in marijuana (trafficking charge consolidated with earlier indictment); convicted and sentenced to 24 years.
- Pretrial and trial disputes included a jail‑cell search that yielded potentially privileged documents, Brown’s recorded post‑arrest interview and whether he unambiguously invoked counsel, late disclosure/identification of a Commonwealth expert, admissibility of that expert’s windshield/bullet‑penetration testimony, exclusion of victim toxicology evidence, and alleged unredacted prejudicial statements and a TV clip shown to the jury.
- Trial court denied motions to dismiss (for alleged Sixth Amendment intrusion), to suppress statements (Miranda invocation deemed ambiguous), for a directed verdict on trafficking, and for a mistrial based on unredacted material; allowed the Commonwealth’s expert testimony after a Daubert hearing and excluded Dr. Stewart’s toxicology opinion as irrelevant.
- On appeal the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, finding no Sixth Amendment violation (no prejudice), Brown did not unequivocally invoke counsel, RCr 7.24 disclosure rules were not violated, the expert was properly qualified and reliable, and any errors were not prejudicial.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jail‑cell search / right to counsel (Sixth Amendment & privilege) | Seizure of jail‑cell documents (some attorney‑client privileged) violated right to counsel and required dismissal | Search for original media letters was proper; seizure of privileged material was inadvertent; no prejudice or use of privileged content | No violation; warrant and officer intent were proper, seizure inadvertent, no prejudice shown; denial of dismissal affirmed |
| Motion to suppress recorded statements (Miranda invocation) | Brown asked about getting a lawyer, which he says invoked his right to counsel and required cessation | Brown’s questions about how soon a lawyer could appear were ambiguous, not an unequivocal request | Invocation was ambiguous; detectives’ conduct lawful; suppression denied |
| Discovery under RCr 7.24 (expert ID/disclosure) | Commonwealth failed to disclose identity/opinion of expert, denying effective cross‑examination | RCr 7.24 requires a written request for expert info; defense failed to request in writing | No error; defense did not make written request as required |
| Expert admissibility / Daubert (windshield/bullet penetration) | Detective Jawor’s methodology insufficiently scientific; testimony unreliable | Jawor’s specialized training and experience qualified him; opinion based on experience is admissible | Trial court did not abuse discretion; expert properly qualified and testimony admissible |
| Exclusion of victim toxicology testimony | Dr. Stewart’s opinion that victim was a recent marijuana user was relevant to victim’s state of mind / intent to rob | Toxicology could not show timing, amount, or impairment; not probative of contested facts | Exclusion proper — testimony irrelevant as offered |
| Mistrial / unredacted interview & TV clip impeachment | Unredacted detective opinion and TV clip (Brown saying “Hello America”) were prejudicial and warranted mistrial | Statements were minor, defense had opened collateral door on demeanor, and prejudice was not so great as to deny fair trial | Denial of mistrial affirmed; any error was not of magnitude to require mistrial (harmless) |
Key Cases Cited
- Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (U.S. 1977) (government intrusion into attorney‑client relationship requires showing of use or prejudice)
- United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (U.S. 1981) (even purposeful government intrusion requires a showing of prejudice)
- United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580 (6th Cir.) (factors for assessing informant/government intrusion into counsel relationship)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (U.S. 1994) (request for counsel must be unambiguous; ambiguous statements do not invoke Edwards protection)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (U.S. 1966) (custodial interrogation warnings and right to counsel)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981) (once an unequivocal request for counsel is made, interrogation must cease)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1993) (trial judge’s gatekeeping role on expert reliability)
- Dixon v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 426 (Ky. 2004) (police officer expert testimony based on specialized experience can be admissible without complex scientific data)