Brown v. Burnett, 144 N.E.3d 475

Brown purchased a Springfield, Ohio home from the Burnetts in 2012; the sellers signed a property-disclosure form denying knowledge of water intrusion, excess moisture, or mold.
A pre-closing whole-house inspection did not identify mold; after closing Brown removed laminate flooring in a bedroom and discovered staining and mold inside wall cavities and other areas.
Multiple consultants (civil/structural engineers, a remediator, and a contractor) concluded the brick veneer/weep-hole defects and poor construction caused long‑term moisture intrusion and widespread mold; remediation cost about $85,000.
Brown sued the Burnetts for rescission and fraud/non-disclosure, alleging the sellers had actual knowledge of latent water/mold problems; the magistrate granted a motion in limine limiting testimony from several of Brown’s experts about the age of the mold but allowed other mold-opinion testimony (and permitted one of Brown’s witnesses, Stege, broader testimony).
At trial the jury ruled for the Burnetts; on appeal Brown challenged (1) exclusion/limitation of her experts’ testimony about the age/timing of mold and (2) admission of a lay witness’s opinion from the Burnetts that stains looked "fresh."

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the magistrate erred by limiting/excluding Brown’s experts from testifying about the age/timing of mold (Daubert gatekeeping)	Brown: experts were qualified by experience and should be allowed to opine on when mold developed; exclusion impaired her ability to prove the sellers’ actual knowledge	Burnetts: Brown failed to make an adequate, specific proffer; experts lacked reliable methods or training to date mold	Court: No reversible error. Proffers were nonspecific; the experts conceded they could not reliably date mold. Any error was harmless/irrelevant because experts could not tie mold to a timeframe proving sellers’ knowledge.
Whether the court abused discretion by allowing the Burnetts’ lay witness (Eben) to state that stains looked "fresh"	Brown: admitting Eben’s lay opinion was inconsistent with limiting her experts and unfairly prejudicial/surprising	Burnetts: Eben was a disclosed fact witness; his testimony was perception-based lay opinion under Evid.R. 701 and helpful to the jury	Court: Admission was within trial court’s discretion. Eben’s perception-based opinion was admissible, not treated as expert testimony, and not prejudicial.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (trial court must ensure expert testimony rests on reliable foundation and is relevant)
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (Daubert gatekeeping applies to all expert testimony; reliability inquiry is flexible)
Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 607 (1998) (Ohio adopts Daubert gatekeeping approach)
Terry v. Caputo, 115 Ohio St.3d 351 (2007) (courts should favor admissibility when Evid.R. 702 criteria are met)
State v. Grubb, 28 Ohio St.3d 199 (1986) (motion in limine rulings are tentative; party must proffer excluded evidence at trial to preserve error)
Layman v. Binns, 35 Ohio St.3d 176 (1988) (caveat emptor and seller duty to disclose latent defects within actual knowledge)
Volbers-Klarich v. Middletown Mgt., Inc., 125 Ohio St.3d 494 (2010) (elements of common-law fraud require actual knowledge or recklessness that may permit an inference of knowledge)
AAA Enters., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157 (1990) (definition of abuse of discretion)
Hayward v. Summa Health Sys./Akron City Hosp., 139 Ohio St.3d 238 (2014) (reversal for evidentiary error requires that, without the error, the jury probably would not have reached the same verdict)