Brown v. Brown, 2012 Ark. 89

Michelle and Vernon Brown married in 2008 and separated in 2009; they have a daughter born in 2009.
The divorce decree (Nov. 2010) incorporated a visitation plan: during the daughter’s first 18 months Vernon had limited visitation to accommodate breastfeeding.
At 18 months, the parties were to adopt a standard visitation schedule thereafter.
In mid-2011 the child still nursed aggressively; Michelle consulted a lactation expert and attempted weaning schedules.
Michelle moved to modify visitation Aug. 2011 to permit continued breastfeeding; the circuit court dismissed the motion; Michelle appealed.
The appellate court held the issue was not moot and reviewed whether there was a material change in circumstances warranting modification.]
(Note: This item summarizes the legally material timeline and rationale for the court’s decision, within the scope of the material change in circumstances standard.)

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a material change in circumstances justifies modification to permit continued breastfeeding	Brown contends the child’s desire to nurse beyond 18 months constitutes a material change	Brown asserts no material change; parties anticipated possible continued nursing but assignment remains within original framework	No material change; modification denied
Whether the appeal is moot	Appeal not moot because relief could exceed 2-year window or could be revisited	Appeal moot since child surpassed two years	Not moot; addressed on merits due to potential broader relief or repeatability

Baber v. Baber, 378 S.W.3d 699 (Ark. 2011) (establishes general framework for modification in context of custody/visitation)
Jones v. Jones, 931 S.W.2d 767 (Ark. 1996) (cannot use circumstances created after the fact as grounds for modification)
Taylor v. Taylor, 110 S.W.3d 731 (Ark. 2003) (remarriage/financially oriented factors predate decree; not material change)
Stellpflug v. Stellpflug, 14 S.W.3d 536 (Ark. App. 2000) (attitude toward summer visitation alone not a material change)
Lewellyn v. Lewellyn, 93 S.W.3d 681 (Ark. 2002) (requires material change analysis before modifying custody)