Brown-Forman Corporation v. George Miller
2014 SC 000717
Ky.Oct 24, 2017Background
- George Miller owns residential property near Brown-Forman and Heaven Hill bourbon warehouses in Jefferson County; bourbon aging in charred-oak barrels emits ethanol vapor (the "angel's share").
- Miller alleges fugitive ethanol emissions promote growth of Baudoinia compniacensis ("whiskey fungus") that coats and damages his property surfaces.
- Miller sued in state court asserting negligence, private nuisance, and trespass claims and sought an injunction requiring additional pollution-control technology; defendants moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) arguing Clean Air Act (CAA) preemption.
- The trial court dismissed all claims as preempted; the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed as to damages claims and allowed injunctive relief to proceed; the Supreme Court of Kentucky granted review.
- The Kentucky Supreme Court held the CAA does not preempt state-law claims for monetary damages (private nuisance, negligence, trespass) arising from particularized property harm, but it rejected Miller’s requested injunction to impose specific pollution-control technology because (1) such relief would intrude on EPA/permit-authority decisions and (2) Kentucky law restricts the state agency from adopting standards more stringent than federal requirements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Clean Air Act preempts Miller's state tort claims for monetary damages | CAA does not preempt state common-law remedies for private, particularized property harms from emissions | CAA preempts state-law claims because EPA/permit regime governs emissions | Held: CAA does not preempt state-law claims for monetary damages; remanded for trial on merits |
| Whether the CAA preempts injunctive relief requiring additional pollution-control technology | Injunction is an available state-law remedy to abate ongoing nuisance | Injunction would intrude on federal/state permitting and is preempted | Held: Injunction requiring technology is inappropriate here; relief would conflict with permitting authority and Kentucky statute limiting state agency stringency |
| Whether a trial court may order technology-based abatement when defendant complies with permits | Miller: courts may remedy ongoing private nuisances even if source holds permits | Brown-Forman: court-ordered technology would second-guess permit determinations and upset regulatory balance | Held: Courts should not impose technology requirements that alter permit-based regulatory balances; injunctive relief denied |
| Applicability of CAA savings clauses to preserve state common-law claims | Miller: CAA savings clauses preserve state-law remedies, including private tort claims | Brown-Forman: savings clauses do not permit remedies that conflict with federal regulatory scheme | Held: Savings clauses and precedent preserve state-law claims for source-state private harms, but do not authorize injunctions that conflict with permitting decisions |
Key Cases Cited
- Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, Inc., 805 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2015) (held CAA does not preempt state common-law claims by plaintiffs in the source state)
- American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (displacement of federal common law nuisance by CAA does not equal preemption of state law)
- Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (Clean Water Act savings clause preserves source-state common-law claims)
- City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (interpretation of citizen-suit savings language disclaims that citizen-suit provision nullifies other remedies)
- Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguished public- vs. private-nuisance preemption; preserved source-state private claims)
- Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58 (Iowa 2014) (state supreme court holding that CAA does not preempt private tort claims for particularized property harm)