Brown ex rel. Estate of Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp. ex rel. Martin-Marietta Corp.
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2763
| 2d Cir. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff Cindy S. Brown (personal representative of her father’s estate) sued Lockheed Martin for asbestos-related torts arising from exposures outside Connecticut; Lockheed is incorporated and headquartered in Maryland.
- Lockheed registered to do business in Connecticut in 1995 and appointed an in‑state agent for service; between 2008–2012 it leased four Connecticut sites and employed ~30–70 workers, generating modest revenue there.
- Brown conceded no basis for specific jurisdiction and argued registration + agent appointment constituted consent to general jurisdiction; she also argued Lockheed’s Connecticut contacts were “continuous and systematic” under Goodyear/Daimler.
- Lockheed argued registration at most consents to specific jurisdiction (for in‑state matters) and that subjecting it to general jurisdiction in Connecticut would violate due process under Daimler.
- The district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction; the Second Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Lockheed was not "essentially at home" in Connecticut under Daimler, and (2) Connecticut’s registration/agent statutes, as written and interpreted, do not clearly consent registrants to general jurisdiction — construing them to do so would raise serious federal‑constitutional concerns.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Connecticut courts have general (all‑purpose) jurisdiction over Lockheed based on its in‑state contacts | Lockheed’s long‑standing physical presence, employees, leased facilities and revenue in CT render it “continuous and systematic” and therefore “essentially at home” in CT under Goodyear/Daimler | Lockheed’s CT contacts are a tiny fraction of its nationwide/global activity and fall short of Daimler’s high “essentially at home” standard | Held: No — Lockheed’s CT contacts do not meet Daimler’s demanding standard for general jurisdiction |
| Whether Lockheed’s 1995 registration and appointment of an agent to receive process in CT constituted consent to general jurisdiction | Registration + agent appointment equals consent to be haled into CT courts for all claims (relying on Pennsylvania Fire and Connecticut App. Ct. dicta) | Registration at most consents to being served and to jurisdiction over causes arising from in‑state business; statute lacks clear language consenting to all‑purpose jurisdiction; construing otherwise raises due‑process concerns | Held: No — CT statute is ambiguous and does not clearly show registrant consent to general jurisdiction; cannot infer such broad consent given Daimler concerns |
| Whether Pennsylvania Fire forecloses the Daimler analysis when a defendant has “consented” via registration | Pennsylvania Fire supports treating statutory appointment of in‑state agent as consent that satisfies due process, so Daimler is inapplicable where consent exists | Daimler’s modern limits on general jurisdiction supersede the broad, territorial assumptions underlying Pennsylvania Fire; consent inferred from routine registration is too thin | Held: Pennsylvania Fire is not dispositive; modern Daimler/Goodyear framework limits reliance on Pennsylvania Fire to justify broad general jurisdiction by implied registration consent |
| Whether Connecticut courts’ prior Appellate Court dicta (Talenti) compels a different result | Talenti and similar authority suggest registration equals consent to general jurisdiction | Talenti is dicta, factually distinguishable, and inconsistent with Daimler; statute’s text does not give sufficient notice of such sweeping consent | Held: Talenti’s dicta do not control; absent a clear legislative statement or Connecticut Supreme Court ruling, registration does not effect consent to general jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746 (U.S. 2014) (sets the modern, restrictive "essentially at home" standard for general jurisdiction)
- Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (U.S. 2011) (limits general jurisdiction; continuity/systematic contacts are insufficient absent being "at home")
- International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (U.S. 1945) (minimum contacts and due‑process foundation for personal jurisdiction)
- Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (U.S. 1917) (historical precedent treating licensing/appointment of agent as consent to suit)
- Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (U.S. 1952) (an "exceptional case" where corporate operations temporarily made the forum effectively the corporation’s surrogate headquarters)
- Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (U.S. 1982) (personal jurisdiction can be waived/consented to)
- Chloé v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2010) (distinguishes specific and general jurisdiction standards)
- Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (pre‑Goodyear/Daimler precedent on contacts and jurisdiction)