Brown-Carson v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 159 A.3d 303

Petitioner worked as a 911 call operator (high-volume typing) for years; diagnosed with carpal tunnel in 1992, detailed to less-typing work in 1993, returned to call work in 2004.
On March 28, 2012 petitioner experienced severe left-wrist pain while typing; she filed a CMPA workers’ compensation claim and notified her supervisor in early April 2012.
Employer’s exams gave mixed opinions: employer-designated orthopedist noted carpal-tunnel signs but suggested diabetes/inflammatory disease contribution; treating physician attributed causation to work.
ALJ credited petitioner’s treating physician, found the condition was work-related and that the aggravation manifested as disabling on March 28, 2012, awarding temporary total disability benefits.
The CRB reversed, treating the claim as a cumulative-trauma case and applying a manifestation rule (adopted from WCA/Franklin/VanHoose) fixing the injury date at the 1992 diagnosis, concluding notice was untimely; the D.C. Court of Appeals reviews the CRB decision.

Issue	Brown-Carson's Argument	District/CRB's Argument	Held
Whether the injury should be treated as an aggravation of a non‑disabling preexisting condition versus exclusively a cumulative trauma	The ALJ correctly treated the 2012 event as an aggravation of a preexisting, non‑disabling carpal‑tunnel condition and awarded benefits	CRB treated the condition solely as cumulative trauma and thus governed by the manifestation rule	Court held CRB erred by ignoring plausible aggravation characterization and other factual interpretations; remanded for reconsideration
Whether CRB properly applied the WCA/Franklin manifestation rule (diagnosis or first medical care) to fix the CMPA notice date	Brown‑Carson argued CMPA’s latent‑disability/awareness language supports an awareness-based rule (Poole/Pooled approach) and that her 1992 checkup did not constitute seeking medical care	CRB applied Franklin/VanHoose formulation (first medical visit or date stopped working), treating petitioner’s 1992 diagnosis as the triggering date	Court held CRB misapplied the manifestation rule: treating a diagnosis as equivalent to seeking care was arbitrary; CMPA latent‑disability provision supports awareness‑based inquiry; remanded for analysis consistent with opinion

King v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 742 A.2d 460 (D.C. 1999) (directs agency to choose and justify a rule for fixing time of injury in cumulative‑trauma cases)
Poole v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 77 A.3d 460 (D.C. 2013) (endorses awareness‑based test for when notice period begins to run)
Smith v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 934 A.2d 428 (D.C. 2007) (discusses manifestation rule variants and agency adoption in context)
McCamey v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 947 A.2d 1191 (D.C. 2008) (explains deference limits for agency interpretations and reading an aggravation rule into CMPA)
Mushroom Transp. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 698 A.2d 430 (D.C. 1997) (precedent on agency deference and statutory interpretation relevant to time‑of‑injury analysis)