Broussard, Kenneth
2017 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 377
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2017Background
- Dec. 10, 2014: Broussard arrested with <1 gram of an unidentified substance; a field test indicated cocaine. He was charged with delivery of cocaine (<1 g) with two enhancement paragraphs.
- Dec. 12, 2014: Broussard pleaded guilty under a plea bargain: eight months in state jail and the State abandoned both enhancements. He executed a sworn judicial confession and waived trial rights.
- Feb. 9, 2015: Lab report from the Houston Forensic Science Center identified the seized substance as methamphetamine (also penalty group 1), not cocaine.
- Broussard filed a habeas corpus application arguing his plea was involuntary and violated due process because the State could not prove he delivered cocaine. The habeas judge and the Harris County DA recommended relief.
- The Court denied relief, holding the plea was voluntary and intelligent because Broussard had sufficient awareness of the law and facts (including that the precise identity of the substance was unknown when he pleaded). Concurring and dissenting opinions disagreed about whether the absence of cocaine amounted to factual innocence sufficient to void the plea.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was Broussard’s guilty plea involuntary because post-plea lab tests showed the substance was methamphetamine, not cocaine? | Broussard: plea was unknowing and involuntary because he would not have pleaded guilty had he known the substance was not cocaine; there was no evidentiary support for the charged offense. | State/Majority: plea was voluntary because Broussard knowingly pleaded when the substance identity was not yet established and he accepted benefits (reduced sentence, dropped enhancements); later change in a “known unknown” does not void plea. | Denied relief: plea was voluntary and intelligent; misapprehension about evidence strength does not automatically permit withdrawal. |
| Does post-plea absence of the particular charged substance constitute factual innocence (entitling withdrawal)? | Broussard: lab result showing no cocaine means factual innocence of the cocaine charge. | State/Majority: presence of a penalty-group-1 controlled substance (meth) means the defendant possessed a penalty-group-1 substance; identity difference is a known unknown and not dispositive here. | Held: Not factual innocence for these circumstances; Ex parte Mable (no illicit substance at all) is distinguishable. |
| Is pre-plea disclosure of such lab results required as non-impeachment, constitutionally material evidence? | Broussard: evidence undermined the existence of the specific charged offense, so ought to have been known pre-plea. | State/Majority: Ruiz and Brady permit accepting pleas despite incomplete knowledge; the Constitution does not require full disclosure of all evidence before plea. | Held: No constitutional requirement to disclose such evidence pre-plea here; plea remained voluntary. |
| Does Ex parte Mable or Ruiz control so as to require relief? | Broussard relies on Mable to show pleas can be vacated where the charged substance is absent. | State/Majority: Mable involved complete absence of any illicit substance (crucial difference); Ruiz/Brady control the voluntariness standard. | Held: Mable is distinguishable; Brady/Ruiz/Palmberg support denying relief. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (pre-plea disclosure of impeachment evidence not constitutionally required)
- Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (plea not involuntary merely because defendant later misapprehends strength of State’s case)
- Ex parte Palmberg, 491 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (defendant who pleads with known unknowns cannot later unwind plea because the State’s case was weaker than thought)
- Ex parte Mable, 443 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (post-plea lab showing no illicit substance at all can render plea involuntary)