Broughman v. Carver
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23502
| 4th Cir. | 2010Background
- Broughman operated a Virginia gun shop under ATF dealer license and sold/assembled firearms.
- During a 2006 ATF inspection, Carver found violations and concluded Broughman needed a manufacturer’s license.
- Broughman challenged the finding; Carver’s findings were upheld by Carver’s supervisor.
- Broughman obtained a manufacturer's license to continue operations and sued for declaratory relief.
- The district court held Broughman’s activities fell within manufacturing under the GCA and granted summary judgment for ATF.
- On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, ruling Broughman is a firearms manufacturer under the GCA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is Broughman a manufacturer or dealer under the GCA? | Broughman contends dealer definition governs; manufacturer clause does not apply. | ATF argues overlapping both roles can exist; apply plain meaning. | Broughman is a manufacturer; district court affirmed. |
| Does the dealer definition render the manufacturer provision superfluous? | Specific dealer term controls; manufacturer term becomes null. | Overlap is permitted; both provisions valid and complementary. | Both dealer and manufacturer provisions apply; not superfluous. |
Key Cases Cited
- Carbon Fuel Co. v. USX Corp., 100 F.3d 1124 (4th Cir. 1996) (plain meaning governs statutory interpretation)
- Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (S. Ct. 1996) (specific governs the general in some contexts)
- United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 529 (1955) (duty to give effect to every clause and word)
- Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1987) (interpret text in dominating general purpose)
- New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (regulatory goals of licensing schemes)
- Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156 (4th Cir. 1996) (GCA regulatory context and tracing system)
- RSM, Inc. v. Buckles, 254 F.3d 61 (4th Cir. 2001) (ATF firearms tracing system interpretation)
- United States v. Joshua, 607 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2010) (statutory interpretation de novo)
