Brosnahan v. Caliber Home Loans Incorporated
3:16-cv-08277
D. Ariz.Sep 19, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Michael Brosnahan, proceeding pro se, owns Sedona real property secured by a 2006 Countrywide deed of trust; he defaulted in 2009 and a non-judicial foreclosure is pending.
- Plaintiff filed suit (Nov. 22, 2016) initially alleging an FDCPA violation and sought a TRO to stop a foreclosure scheduled the next day; the TRO was denied for lack of proper Rule 65(b)(1) notice and on the merits.
- Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint asserting RESPA, TILA, and FDCPA claims against Caliber Home Loans, LSF9 Master Participation Trust, and Summit Service and Realty LLC.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and for noncompliance with pleading rules (Rules 8, 9, 10).
- The court found the 27-page amended complaint to be verbose, unclear, and insufficient to provide fair notice of claims; prior similar dismissals put Plaintiff on notice of pleading requirements.
- The court granted the motion to dismiss but gave Plaintiff 30 days to file a second amended complaint that complies with the Federal Rules; failure to amend would result in termination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether amended complaint states FDCPA, RESPA, or TILA claims | Brosnahan alleges violations of FDCPA, RESPA, and TILA related to the foreclosure | Defendants argue claims are legally insufficient and pleadings fail to give fair notice | Dismissed for failure to state plausible claims and inadequate pleadings |
| Whether mortgagees/beneficiaries are "debt collectors" under FDCPA | Brosnahan treats foreclosure-related actors as debt collectors | Defendants: mortgagees/beneficiaries and foreclosure facilitation are not FDCPA debt collection | Court previously and again rejected FDCPA theory; dismissal appropriate |
| Whether complaint complies with Rules 8, 9, 10 (pleading requirements) | Brosnahan contends his narrative suffices to state claims | Defendants contend complaint is rambling, unclear, and fails to meet Rule 8/10 minimums | Complaint violates Rules 8/10; dismissal ordered but leave to amend granted |
| Whether pro se status excuses noncompliance given prior cases | Brosnahan implies leniency for pro se filings | Defendants point to Plaintiff’s litigation history and prior dismissals for same defects | Court applies Ghazali: pro se must follow rules; prior dismissals weigh against excusing defects |
Key Cases Cited
- Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2009) (accept well-pled factual allegations as true on motion to dismiss)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (legal conclusions need not be accepted as true)
- In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2010) (complaints failing to plead facts are insufficient to defeat dismissal)
- Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001) (court need not accept allegations that contradict judicially noticeable facts or are unreasonable inferences)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 1996) (complaint must be simple, concise, and direct to give fair notice)
- Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52 (9th Cir. 1995) (pro se litigants remain bound by procedural rules)