Broome v. United States, 240 A.3d 35

Around 5:00 a.m. on July 7, 2017, campus police found Matthew Broome sleeping in a barricaded employees-only locker room in the basement of Howard University Hospital; he claimed to be waiting for a contractor.
Officers forced entry, could not verify Broome’s contractor story, summoned MPD, and arrested Broome for unlawful entry; a search incident to arrest uncovered methamphetamine on his person.
Broome was charged under D.C. Code § 22-3302(a) (unlawful entry of a private building) and convicted after a bench trial; he moved for acquittal arguing the Hospital is open to the public and thus not a private building.
Broome separately argued he should have been charged under § 22-3302(b) (public building), which would have entitled him to a jury trial; the trial court rejected that argument and found the Hospital was not a public institution.
On appeal, the court addressed statutory interpretation of “public building,” precedent recognizing Howard University Hospital as a private facility, and whether the trial court could rely on judicial notice (or existing precedent) to find the Hospital private.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Howard University Hospital is a "public building" under § 22-3302(b) (entitling Broome to a jury)	Broome: Hospital is open to the public, so it is a public building and § 22-3302(b) applies (jury right).	Government/Trial Ct.: "Public building" refers generally to buildings owned by D.C. or the U.S.; Howard Univ. Hospital is private.	Court: "Public building" generally means D.C./U.S.-owned buildings; treating every publicly accessible facility as public would frustrate Council's intent; Howard Univ. Hospital is private; no jury right.
Whether the government had to prove (as an element) that the Hospital was private and whether judicial notice of privatestatus was permissible	Broome: Government failed to prove the Hospital was a private building, so conviction under § 22-3302(a) cannot stand.	Government/Trial Ct.: Trial court could rely on precedent and common-knowledge facts (judicial notice) showing Hospital/University are private; any procedural deficiency in taking notice was harmless.	Court: Trial court correctly found the Hospital private based on precedent and facts appropriate for judicial notice; any failure to give formal notice was not reversible error; conviction affirmed.

Whittlesey v. United States, 221 A.2d 86 (D.C. 1966) (interpreting "public building" as generally covering buildings owned by D.C. or the United States)
Frey v. United States, 137 A.3d 1000 (D.C. 2016) (distinguishing jury-right consequences under § 22-3302(a) and (b))
Wicks v. United States, 226 A.3d 743 (D.C. 2020) (holding entry onto private property is the first element of unlawful entry under § 22-3302(a))
Burbridge v. Howard Univ., 305 A.2d 245 (D.C. 1973) (noting Howard University Hospital was transferred to Howard University and is a private facility)
Poulnot v. District of Columbia, 608 A.2d 134 (D.C. 1992) (permitting judicial notice of facts "well-known" in the community or readily determinable from unimpeachable sources)
Gaither v. District of Columbia, 333 A.2d 57 (D.C. 1975) (taking judicial notice that Lorton Reformatory was owned and operated by the District)