Broom v. Jennifer J., 742 S.E.2d 382

Mother gave birth to Child in March 2007; DSS received August 2007 neglect report citing unsafe home, drug use, and poor medical care for Child.
Child removed August 17, 2007 and placed in emergency protective custody; Child initially placed with Brooms for foster care.
Family court found probable cause for removal based on positive cocaine test and Mother’s admission of substance abuse; counsel appointed for Mother.
Mother’s treatment plan required stabilization, assessments, parenting classes, employment for six months, and random drug testing; visitation set at least twice monthly.
Over ensuing years, Mother had multiple positive drug tests early on but later passed drug screens; Mother largely ceased outside employment and became primary caregiver for third child and Sister; final TPR hearing held November 1, 2011 with Mother represented by counsel.
The family court found best interest favored termination, declared two statutory grounds satisfied (fifteen of twenty-two months in foster care and failure to visit), and terminated Mother’s parental rights in favor of the Brooms.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether denial of counsel requires reversal of TPR	Mother argues denial of counsel violated due process	DSS argues no automatic right to counsel in TPR; may be reversible only if prejudice shown	No reversal for lack of prejudice; grounds still satisfied.
Whether statutory grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence	Mother contends grounds not satisfied given delays	Court correctly applied time-in-foster-care and willful-visit grounds	Both grounds satisfied by clear and convincing evidence.
Whether expert testimony was admissible given disclosure issues	Mother contends lack of disclosure prejudiced defense	Court had discretion; insufficient showing of prejudice	Issue abandoned by Mother; no reversible error shown.

Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1981) (no absolute right to counsel in TPR; due process depends on totality of circumstances)
In re Vanderhorst, 287 S.C. 554 (S.C. 1986) (due process requires counsel in some TPR cases; Lassiter standard applied)
Marccuci, 396 S.C. 218 (S.C. 2011) (delay in proceedings bears on adequacy of grounds; delays caused by others reviewed)
Loe v. M other, Father, & Berkeley Cty. DSS, 382 S.C. 457 (S.C. 2009) (delays attributable to DSS; fifteen-months ground scrutinized)
Seegars v. DSS, 367 S.C. 623 (S.C. 2006) (willfulness defined and applied in termination context)