Brooks v. State
309 Ga. 630
| Ga. | 2020Background:
- On July 22, 2015, Branden “Big B” Tinch was shot and later died; Lenard Gay was wounded. Witnesses testified that Deontae Brooks emerged from a house, entered the rear passenger seat of Tinch’s car, and produced a revolver; Gay fired back as they fled.
- Police evidence: Gay identified Brooks from a photo lineup; Brooks’ phone had called Tinch earlier that day; Brooks was arrested in Ohio about a month later.
- Brooks was indicted on multiple counts including malice murder, aggravated assault, and a firearms enhancement under OCGA § 16-11-133(b) (possession of a gun by a convicted felon during commission of enumerated felonies). He was convicted on all counts and sentenced to life without parole; numerous firearms counts were merged into the § 16-11-133(b) conviction.
- At trial the State stipulated Brooks had a 2007 aggravated-assault-with-intent-to-rob conviction but excluded the full prior-conviction record; the stipulation did not establish that the prior felony involved use/possession of a firearm.
- The State conceded insufficiency on the § 16-11-133(b) count; the Court reversed that conviction, affirmed the malice murder and aggravated-assault convictions, and remanded with direction to enter convictions/sentences on the merged firearm counts under other firearm statutes.
Issues:
| Issue | Brooks' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Sufficiency of evidence for conviction under OCGA § 16-11-133(b) (possession by a convicted felon during commission of a felony) | The trial evidence and stipulation proved Brooks’ prior conviction and guilt for possessing a firearm during the charged offense | The State conceded the evidence was insufficient | Reversed: stipulation did not establish that Brooks’ prior felony involved use/possession of a firearm; record excluded the prior-conviction documents and no witnesses from 2007 testified, so § 16-11-133(b) conviction could not stand |
| 2. Whether other convictions (malice murder, aggravated assault, and the underlying firearm possession counts) were supported by sufficient evidence | Brooks did not challenge sufficiency; argued ineffective assistance and other errors | State argued evidence supported convictions | Affirmed: evidence sufficient for malice murder and aggravated assault; court also found sufficient evidence for the other firearm-possession counts (to be entered after remand) under Jackson v. Virginia standard |
| 3. Ineffective assistance for choosing self-defense over defense of habitation | Trial counsel was deficient for asserting self-defense and not defense-of-habitation; counsel’s closing speculations effectively admitted Brooks committed a felony (drug transaction), which would bar self-defense | State argued counsel’s strategy was reasonable: no evidence Brooks was committing a felony; counsel’s closing argument is not evidence; defense of habitation was a novel/doubtful theory given facts | Denied: no deficient performance shown — counsel’s strategy was reasonable, no evidence Brooks committed a felony at trial, and defense-of-habitation was inapplicable or novel given precedents |
| 4. Denial of mistrial after witness referenced that “Black Boy” had been in jail (improper testimony) and whether plain error review applies | Brooks argued the comment was prejudicial and warranted mistrial; trial court verbally sustained objection but never ruled on mistrial motion | State relied on the court’s curative instruction and the defense’s failure to obtain a ruling as waiver on appeal; plain error review not available beyond statutory limits | Not reached on plain error: appeal waived because defense failed to obtain a ruling; Georgia’s plain error doctrine is limited and doesn’t apply here |
Key Cases Cited
- Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (trial court may exclude full prior-conviction record when it risks unfair prejudice)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for assessing sufficiency of the evidence)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Tiller v. State, 286 Ga. App. 230 (2007) (reversing § 16-11-133(b) conviction where prior conviction could have been misdemeanor and trial evidence did not specify)
- McKie v. State, 306 Ga. 111 (2019) (distinguishing Tiller where context differs)
- Blackmon v. State, 300 Ga. 35 (2016) (directing remand to enter convictions/sentences on merged counts)
- Chester v. State, 284 Ga. 162 (2008) (remand/merger principles for convictions)
- Swanson v. State, 306 Ga. 153 (2019) (ineffective-assistance claim where counsel requested self-defense but not defense-of-habitation and defendant’s testimony foreclosed self-defense)
- Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339 (2013) (standards for assessing counsel performance)
- Marshall v. State, 297 Ga. 445 (2015) (presumption counsel’s performance is within wide range of reasonable conduct)
- Menefee v. State, 301 Ga. 505 (2017) (presumption that juries follow curative instructions)
- Kendrick v. State, 287 Ga. 676 (2010) (defense of habitation in vehicle context and limits where theft/entry is complete)
- Williams v. State, 304 Ga. 455 (2018) (declining to find ineffective assistance for failing to request habitation charge where precedent did not support it)
- Smith v. Stacey, 281 Ga. 601 (2007) (duty to obtain rulings on motions; failure waives appellate review)
- Ross v. State, 296 Ga. 636 (2015) (limits on application of plain-error review in Georgia)