Brooks v. Powers, 178 A.3d 366

Background

On June 18, 2008, during a severe thunderstorm in Westbrook, a town tax collector told Constable Powers that a woman (later identified as Elsie White) was standing in a field in wet clothes, hands raised, and might need medical attention.
Powers called dispatch in a joking tone, said he could not leave the boat (though he and Milardo had already left it), and asked that another officer be sent; the dispatcher testified she forgot to log/send anyone.
The constables later drove by the field, used a spotlight, did not exit the cruiser, saw no one, and left.
White’s body was found floating near shore the next morning; cause of death was accidental drowning. Medical evidence placed time of death between ~7–10 a.m. June 19.
Defendants moved for summary judgment asserting discretionary-act governmental immunity; plaintiff argued the identifiable person/imminent harm exception applied. Trial court granted summary judgment; Appellate Court reversed; Connecticut Supreme Court granted certification.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the identifiable person/imminent harm exception to discretionary-act immunity applies	Brooks: the constables were told of an identifiable person in peril during a severe storm; their failure to investigate exposed White to imminent harm, so immunity does not bar suit	Powers/Milardo: the drowning was too attenuated from the condition reported (standing in a field during a storm); no apparent, specific imminent harm and immunity therefore applies	Court: Exception does not apply — White’s drowning was too attenuated and not a risk so likely to occur that defendants had a clear, unequivocal duty to act immediately
Whether harm that occurred (drowning) was of the same general nature / foreseeable from the reported condition	Brooks: general harm from the storm (exposure/vulnerability) is the relevant framing; drowning is a harm of that general nature and therefore foreseeable	Defs: ordinary negligence foreseeability fails because no reasonable factfinder could link standing in a field during a storm to drowning later in nearby water	Court: Even ordinary negligence foreseeability fails as a matter of law — connection is too attenuated; therefore the more demanding imminent-harm standard also fails
Whether defendants’ reliance on dispatch (told another officer would be sent) made it not apparent they had a duty to act immediately	Brooks: defendants’ flippant call and failure to ensure a check could support a jury finding that their conduct increased risk and they still had a duty	Defs: once dispatcher said someone would be sent, it was not objectively apparent that their personal immediate action was required	Court: Held objectively reasonable to rely on dispatch; combined with attenuation of harm, no clear duty to act immediately

Key Cases Cited

Strycharz v. Cady, 323 Conn. 548 (Conn. 2016) (describing narrow scope of identifiable person/imminent harm exception)
Haynes v. Middletown, 314 Conn. 303 (Conn. 2014) (imminence requires that the danger be so likely to cause harm that a clear and unequivocal duty to act immediately exists)
Coley v. Hartford, 312 Conn. 150 (Conn. 2014) (discretionary-act governmental immunity and distinction from ministerial acts)
Doe v. Petersen, 279 Conn. 607 (Conn. 2006) (identifiable victim/imminent harm exception requires apparentness of the specific harm)
St. Pierre v. Plainfield, 326 Conn. 420 (Conn. 2017) (reaffirming specificity/apparentness requirement)
Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324 (Conn. 2009) (identifiable victim/imminent harm framework)
Cotto v. Board of Education, 294 Conn. 265 (Conn. 2009) (same)
Edgerton v. Clinton, 311 Conn. 217 (Conn. 2014) (contrast between ordinary negligence foreseeability and the more demanding imminent-harm standard)
Sestito v. Groton, 178 Conn. 520 (Conn. 1979) (police duty analysis where passive response may be insufficient)
Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147 (Conn. 1982) (background on public vs. private duties and immunity)