842 F. Supp. 2d 267
D.D.C.2012Background
- Brooks, a TSA employee, was removed from a screener position in 2003 and filed an EEO complaint alleging discriminatory reprisal.
- A 2005 settlement required Brooks’s reinstatement post Phase 2 medical assessment; he was medically disqualified for diabetes notwithstanding a physician finding no risk.
- Brooks appealed to the EEOC; in 2008-2009 the OFO ordered a hearing to examine how TSA applied Medical Guidelines to Brooks and related issues.
- In September 2009 the administrative judge found TSA discriminated by applying Medical Guidelines disparately and not allowing Brooks 65 days for medical evidence.
- TSA issued a final order on November 5, 2009; Brooks sought mandamus and interim relief under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.505 to compel interim restoration.
- The district court granted the motion to dismiss, holding 1614.505 does not apply here, and mandamus relief is inappropriate given lack of a clear right/duty and absence of an adequate alternative remedy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Brooks is entitled to interim relief under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.505 | Brooks argues the case involves removal and seeks interim restoration during TSA appeal. | TSA did not involve removal/separation/suspension under the administrative decision; 1614.505 not triggered. | No interim relief; conditions of 1614.505 not satisfied. |
| Whether mandamus is proper to compel compliance with 1614.505 | 41 Brooks contends 1614.505 creates a mandatory duty to act warranting mandamus relief. | There is no clear right or duty and 1614.505 is not jurisdictional or ministerial to justify mandamus. | Mandamus inappropriate; no clear right or duty and no adequate remedy. |
| Whether alternative remedies under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504 were available | Brooks could pursue noncompliance under 1614.504 per the settlement agreement. | The appropriate mechanism was 1614.504, but plaintiff did not pursue it effectively in the current posture. | Alternative remedy available; plaintiff did not prevail on this path. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (U.S. 2009) (plausibility standard for pleading)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (limited to plausible claims; no bare assertions)
- Anderson v. Holder, 691 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2010) (application of Iqbal/Twombly in D.D.C. context)
- Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33 (U.S. 1980) (mandamus is a drastic, extraordinary remedy)
- Northern States Power Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 128 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (requirements for mandamus relief)
- Council of the Blind of Delaware Cty. Valley, Inc. v. Regan, 709 F.2d 1521 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc standard for mandamus, non-dispositive)