Brooks Ditto, Billy Pembleton, and Karina Castaneda v. Judith Campos and Jessy Campos, 13-15-00517-CV

Judith and Jessy Campos sued Weslaco police officer Karina Castaneda and fellow officers Brooks Ditto and Billy Pembleton alleging Castaneda used her police position to have Jessy wrongfully arrested after a recording device was found in the child’s shoe; causes of action included malicious prosecution and abuse of process.
The Camposes sought damages for emotional and physical harms; pleadings identified Judith as stepmother and Jessy and Castaneda as the child's biological parents.
Appellants (Castaneda, Ditto, Pembleton) asserted governmental/official immunity and filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss and a plea to the jurisdiction arguing the claims arose from actions within the scope of their employment.
Trial court denied both the plea to the jurisdiction and the Rule 91a motion; appellants appealed the denial of the plea and consolidated appeals. The Camposes did not file an appellate brief.
The appellate court considered the pleadings and undisputed evidence (notice of claim letter and an assistant police chief’s affidavit) showing the officers acted within the course and scope of Weslaco employment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the suit against officers is effectively against them in their official capacities because the challenged conduct occurred within scope of employment	Camposes alleged officers committed wrongful acts (malicious prosecution, abuse of process) and sought damages against them individually	Officers argued the pleadings and evidence show their conduct was within the scope of Weslaco police employment, so the suit is effectively against them in their official capacities and must be dismissed under section 101.106(f)	Court held the pleadings and undisputed evidence showed actions were within scope of employment, so suit was against officers in official capacities; dismissal of individual-capacity claims required
Whether governmental immunity bars the Camposes’ intentional-tort claims	Camposes maintained their claims should survive against the officers	Officers argued intentional torts (malicious prosecution, abuse of process) are not waived under the Texas Tort Claims Act and thus immunity applies	Court held immunity applies to intentional torts; appellants entitled to immunity and plea to the jurisdiction should have been granted

Bland Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000) (purpose and effect of a dilatory plea to the jurisdiction)
City of Elsa v. Gonzalez, 325 S.W.3d 622 (Tex. 2010) (standard of review for jurisdictional challenges and consideration of evidence)
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (pleading liberally for jurisdictional inquiries and when to allow amendment)
Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. 2011) (derivative governmental immunity for employees sued in official capacities)
City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) (scope of governmental immunity and ultra vires exception)
City of Hempstead v. Kmiec, 902 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (recognizing malicious prosecution as an intentional tort)