Brookes v. Shank, 2:13-cv-00516

Background

Plaintiff Mark C. Brookes, as administrator of the estate of inmate Gregor Otis Stamper, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging defendants were deliberately indifferent to Stamper’s serious medical needs; Stamper died by suicide on June 1, 2011.
Stamper suffered medically documented severe peripheral neuropathy and long‑standing, severe pain treated with Neurontin (and at times Ultram).
Dr. Myron Shank discontinued Stamper’s pain medication in August 2009 and again in April 2011 (the latter allegedly for refusal to enter substance‑abuse treatment); Stamper received no medication from April 26, 2011 until his death.
Stamper repeatedly reported severe pain and requested treatment; on May 31, 2011 Dr. Shank canceled a requested appointment and allegedly refused to see Stamper.
After Stamper’s death an investigation found Dr. Shank’s care was deficient. Plaintiff does not oppose dismissal of defendants DesMarais, Chambers‑Smith, Hudson, and Eddy.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Statute of limitations (accrual date)	Claim accrued when Stamper was denied care and thus includes May 31–June 1, 2011 acts; earlier denials largely time‑barred.	Claim accrued when medication was discontinued (April 2011) and suit filed May 29, 2013 is untimely as to those acts.	Court: April 2011 discontinuation claims are time‑barred, but May 31, 2011 cancellation/refusal to see Stamper falls within actionable period.
Eighth Amendment — objective element (serious medical need)	Severe peripheral neuropathy and constant excruciating pain satisfy objective prong.	Not disputed that pain existed, but treatment decisions and concerns about abuse were permissible.	Court: Neuropathy and severe pain satisfy the objective component.
Eighth Amendment — subjective element (deliberate indifference)	Allegations that Shank knew of pain, had prior role discontinuing meds, and refused to see Stamper support inference of deliberate indifference.	Discontinuing meds for suspected abuse and relying on records does not show culpable state of mind; negligence or policy‑based decisions are insufficient.	Court: Plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts that, if credited, could show Shank knew of and disregarded an excessive risk (denial by refusing to see him). Claim survives pleading stage.
Qualified immunity	Shank violated clearly established right to treatment for significant pain; therefore no immunity.	Termination of meds over abuse concerns and reasonable reliance on records support immunity.	Court: Right to treatment for significant pain is clearly established; plaintiff has alleged facts showing Shank’s conduct could be objectively unreasonable — qualified immunity not resolved for dismissal.

Key Cases Cited

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs)
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (subjective standard: official must know and disregard substantial risk)
Scott v. Ambani, 577 F.3d 642 (6th Cir. 2009) (both objective and subjective components for prisoner medical claims)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity two‑step framework)
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity standard)
Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (clearly established right must be defined with specificity)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading standard requiring more than conclusory allegations)
Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857 (6th Cir. 1976) (disagreement with medical treatment does not alone state constitutional claim)