Brooke B. v. Donald Ray C., II
230 W. Va. 355
W. Va.2013Background
- A.C. is a child whose biological parents are Leslie F. and Donald C.; Donald previously had primary custody, while Leslie had limited visitation.
- Brooke B. asserts she has functioned as a psychological parent for A.C. for years and seeks either shared parenting or guardianship.
- Brooke’s motion to intervene was filed in Cabell County, later transferred to Kanawha County where A.C. resided with Brooke.
- Donald challenged venue and sought a writ of prohibition, arguing the Kanawha family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
- The circuit court in Kanawha County granted a writ of prohibition, blocking the Kanawha family court from ruling on Brooke’s motion.
- The West Virginia Supreme Court reversed, holding the Kanawha family court did have subject matter jurisdiction and the circuit court erred in prohibiting further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Kanawha County family court had subject matter jurisdiction over Brooke’s motion | Brooke (psychological parent) contends Kanawha court has jurisdiction | Donald argues Kanawha court lacks subject matter jurisdiction | Kanawha family court had subject matter jurisdiction |
| Whether venue was proper in Kanawha County or determined by residency | Brooke contends residency is in Kanawha County | Donald argues residency/venue should be in Putnam or where he resided | Residency controls venue; minor’s residency is a factual question; Kanawha venue may be proper if A.C. resided there |
| Whether a guardian or custodial intervention by a psychological parent is authorized | Statutes authorize intervention by a psychological parent | Respondent argues limits on guardianship/custody interventions | Statutes clearly authorize guardian/custodial questions and intervention by a psychological parent when in child’s best interests |
| Whether the court properly distinguished jurisdiction from venue | Jurisdiction and venue are distinct; court erred in conflating them | Venue issues were misapplied to jurisdiction | Court correctly treated jurisdiction separately from venue; prohibition based on jurisdiction was erroneous |
| Whether the circuit court erred in granting prohibition and halting proceedings | Prohibition improperly blocked child’s best interests consideration | Prohibition was appropriate to prevent improper proceedings | Circuit Court erred; prohibition reversed; Kanawha family court should proceed |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Clifford K., 217 W.Va. 625, 619 S.E.2d 138 (2005) (W.Va. 2005) (recognizes psychological parents may intervene in custody actions)
- In re Abbigail Faye B., 222 W.Va. 466, 665 S.E.2d 300 (2008) (W.Va. 2008) (guides guardianship jurisdiction and procedures; emphasis on minor’s welfare)
- Martin v. West Virginia Div. of Labor Contractor Licensing Bd., 199 W.Va. 613, 486 S.E.2d 782 (1997) (W.Va. 1997) (de novo review standard for writs of prohibition)
- Crawford v. Taylor, 138 W.Va. 207, 75 S.E.2d 370 (1953) (W.Va. 1953) (prohibition lies to restrain inferior courts lacking jurisdiction or exceeding powers)
- Shaw v. Shaw, 155 W.Va. 712, 187 S.E.2d 124 (1972) (W.Va. 1972) (domicile vs residence; residency determines subject matter in guardianship cases)
- Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 213 W.Va. 16, 576 S.E.2d 261 (2002) (W.Va. 2002) (residency typically a factual determination; distinction between residence and domicile)