Bronwyn Benoist Parker v. William Dean Benoist
160 So. 3d 198
Miss.2015Background
- B.D. Benoist executed mutual 1998 wills leaving his children, Bronwyn and William, equal shares; after his wife’s death a trust funded and Bronwyn and William served as cotrustees.
- From 2008–2010 B.D.’s cognitive function declined (diagnosed mild dementia; alcohol and prescription drug use), and he made substantial inter vivos transfers and conveyances favoring William.
- In 2010 B.D. executed a new will that substantially altered distributions and included a broad forfeiture (in terrorem) clause revoking benefits and shifting attorney-fee liability for any beneficiary who contested the will, “regardless of whether instituted in good faith and with probable cause.”
- Bronwyn filed a will contest alleging undue influence and sought removal/accounting from William; a jury found the 2010 will valid and found a confidential relationship but no undue influence.
- The chancery court enforced the forfeiture clause to cut Bronwyn out and initially required her to pay fees; it allowed William, as executor under the 2010 will, to use estate funds to retain counsel and denied removal of William as executor.
- On appeal the Mississippi Supreme Court held that Mississippi recognizes a good-faith and probable-cause exception to forfeiture clauses, found Bronwyn’s contest met that standard, reversed the forfeiture ruling and rendered judgment for Bronwyn; it affirmed the estate’s payment of counsel, reversed and remanded the executor-removal ruling, and affirmed denial of fee recovery under the will.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Parker) | Defendant's Argument (Benoist) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mississippi recognizes a good-faith/probable-cause exception to in terrorem clauses | Forfeiture clauses cannot bar access to courts; should not apply when contest is in good faith with probable cause | Testator’s explicit language controls; clause valid and enforceable | Court adopts exception: forfeiture unenforceable when contest was made in good faith and on probable cause; Bronwyn met that standard |
| Whether Bronwyn’s contest was made in good faith and on probable cause | Contested based on (1) prior mutual wills’ expectations, (2) B.D.’s cognitive decline and substance use, (3) large inter vivos gifts to William | William points to jury verdict validating the will and argues facts presented before continuation of suit undermine good faith | Court finds totality of circumstances support good faith and probable cause; contest protected from forfeiture |
| Whether executor (William) could use estate funds to pay a $20,000 retainer to defend the will | Bronwyn: William’s adverse interest to estate makes using estate funds improper | William: 2010 will was admitted to probate and he as executor may employ counsel and pay reasonable compensation to defend the will/estate | Court affirms: executor may use estate assets to defend the will contest |
| Whether the chancery court erred by refusing to remove William as executor during the contest | Bronwyn: William’s transfers and alleged undue influence create adverse interest warranting temporary administrator | William: Chancellor found disputed facts and declined removal; broad discretion | Court reverses and remands: chancellor applied wrong standard (requiring uncontested evidence); on remand must decide using proper discretionary standard whether to appoint temporary executor |
Key Cases Cited
- Winningham v. Winningham, 966 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. 1998) (applied good-faith/probable-cause exception and assessed factors supporting probable cause)
- South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, 92 Conn. 168 (Conn. 1917) (forfeiture clause frustrates courts’ role; good-faith challengers should not forfeit legacy)
- Tate v. Camp, 245 S.W. 839 (Tenn. 1922) (endorsing equitable rule against strict enforcement of forfeiture clauses)
- In re Chappell’s Estate, 221 P. 336 (Wash. 1923) (applied good-faith and probable-cause exception where contest not frivolous)
- In re Foster’s Estate, 376 P.2d 784 (Kan. 1962) (recognized that bona fide belief with probable cause prevents in terrorem clause application)