Brodsky v. Carter, 673 F. App'x 42

Brodsky, proceeding pro se, sued the New York City Campaign Finance Board seeking compensatory damages after the Board garnished her Exxon Mobil shares to satisfy a state-court judgment requiring repayment of campaign funds.
She asserted § 1983 claims alleging selective, retaliatory enforcement, and asserted claims under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and various provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (including § 6103) based on the Board’s attempt to subpoena her tax returns from her accountant.
The district court dismissed the § 1983 claims as time-barred, dismissed the § 6103 claim for failure to state a claim, and dismissed other IRC and § 371 claims for lack of a private cause of action.
On appeal, the Second Circuit evaluated sua sponte whether Rooker–Feldman deprived the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction over Brodsky’s § 1983 claims, and reviewed de novo the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals and whether statutes provide a private cause of action.
The state courts had previously entered judgment against Brodsky (≈ $35,000) and ordered the garnishment of her Exxon Mobil shares before she commenced the federal action; a state court also ordered her accountant not to produce her tax returns.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Rooker–Feldman bars Brodsky’s § 1983 claims	Brodsky contended the Board’s actions violated § 1983 (oppressive/retaliatory enforcement) and sought damages for value of garnished shares	Board argued federal court lacks jurisdiction because claims effectively challenge state-court judgments allowing garnishment	Rooker–Feldman applies; § 1983 claims barred for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
Whether § 371 or other IRC provisions (except § 6103) provide a private cause of action	Brodsky alleged conspiracy (§ 371) and various IRC violations related to attempts to obtain her tax returns	Board argued those statutes do not create private causes of action	§ 371 and most IRC provisions do not provide a private cause of action; claims dismissed
Whether Brodsky stated a claim under 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (and § 7431)	Brodsky alleged the Board sought her tax returns via subpoena and thus violated § 6103 protections	Board noted no unlawful disclosure occurred and a state court blocked production of the returns	No § 6103 violation pleaded—she alleged only a subpoena request and state court prevented disclosure; dismissal affirmed

Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2002) (discusses Rooker–Feldman and federal jurisdiction limits)
D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (U.S. 1983) (Rooker–Feldman doctrinal foundation)
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (U.S. 2005) (clarifies federal review limits of state-court judgments)
Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005) (articulates the four-part Rooker–Feldman test)
McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2010) (Rooker–Feldman bars § 1983 claims framed to challenge state judgments)
McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007) (examines causal relationship requirement for Rooker–Feldman)
Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2002) (Rule 12(b)(6) standard for dismissal)
Am. Psychiatric Ass’n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc., 821 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2016) (statutory standing/causes of action analysis)
Salahuddin v. Alaji, 232 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2000) (private-right-of-action requirement under federal statutes)
Leon v. Murphy, 988 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1993) (appellate court may affirm on any correct basis supported by the record)