Brodrick Michael James v. State
01-15-00103-CR
| Tex. App. | Aug 10, 2015Background
- Appellant Brodrick Michael James pled guilty to three counts of delivery of a controlled substance; punishment was tried to the court and he received concurrent 45-year sentences.
- Prior to the narcotics transactions, Investigator Marcos Salinas (undercover) recorded multiple phone calls and video-recorded controlled buys of methamphetamine from James.
- After a July 18, 2014 meeting regarding a proposed cocaine purchase, two calls were received from James’ phone: one confirmatory call and a second accidental call (a "butt dial") in which James was overheard stating he planned to rob the undercover officers during the drug transaction.
- Investigators used the recording of the accidental call to suspend further dealings and to support the investigation and prosecution; James challenged admission of that recording as a Fourth Amendment and Texas wiretap violation.
- On the day of trial James asked to discharge his court-appointed counsel; the trial court denied the request. James later pleaded guilty and proceeded to punishment, then appealed, raising: (1) denial of new counsel request, (2) admissibility of the accidental-call recording, (3) ineffective assistance for failure to preserve the Fourth Amendment objection, and (4) scope of appealability after his plea.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Trial court refusal to discharge court-appointed counsel on day of trial | James: denial abused discretion; he felt uncomfortable and had potential new counsel ready | State: request made at the last minute with no evidence of conflict, bad faith, or inability of counsel to represent him; court must manage docket | Trial court did not abuse its discretion; denial proper. |
| 2. Admissibility of the accidental ("butt dial") phone call | James: recording invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy and violated Fourth Amendment and Texas wiretap law | State: James voluntarily used his phone and exposed the conversation through carelessness; no objectively reasonable privacy expectation; not an "oral communication" protected by statute | Recording admissible; no Fourth Amendment or Texas-wiretap violation. |
| 3. Ineffective assistance for failing to object to the recording | James: counsel's failure to preserve Fourth Amendment/wiretap objection was deficient and prejudicial | State: underlying Fourth Amendment/wiretap claim lacks merit; counsel not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection; silent record does not rebut presumption of reasonable strategy | Ineffective-assistance claim fails; no deficient performance or prejudice shown. |
| 4. Scope of appeal after guilty plea and waiver/no PSI | James: contends he retained right to appeal both guilt-innocence and punishment | State: plea resulted in court determining punishment and certification limited appeal to punishment; but appellate jurisdiction may extend given open plea on punishment issues | State concedes appellate jurisdiction extends to points raised; certification issue resolvable on remand if needed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (defendant bears burden to show legitimate expectation of privacy to challenge government intrusion)
- Granados v. State, 85 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (factors for objective reasonableness of privacy expectation; totality-of-circumstances test)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Fourth Amendment protects people, not places; reasonable expectation of privacy test)
- Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (plain-view/plain-feel principles where lawful vantage point negates expectation of privacy)
- Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (no Fourth Amendment protection for information knowingly exposed to third parties)
- Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (observing contraband from lawful vantage point involves no protected expectation of privacy)
- Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (appealability rules after guilty pleas; distinctions for open pleas and plea bargains)
