Brittany Harris v. Kimberly Klare
902 F.3d 630
| 6th Cir. | 2018Background
- On May 22, 2014, police stopped a family minivan for an obstructed license plate; the driver (Harris’s mother) was arrested and officers searched/investigated the vehicle for potential drug activity.
- Officers noted tools in the van and summoned a drug dog, which (according to Harris) completed a sniff and gave no positive alert.
- Seventeen-year-old Brittany Harris needed to use a restroom; Officer Kimberly Klare was summoned, escorted Harris away from the van after obtaining the father’s consent to escort, and told Harris she “may have to search” her.
- Harris’s hands were secured behind her back; she alleges Klare performed an invasive pat-down including reaching under her bra and pinching her breasts, finding no contraband.
- Harris sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming the search violated the Fourth Amendment; the district court granted summary judgment to Klare (qualified immunity), and the Sixth Circuit reversed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Harris was lawfully seized at time of search | Harris: seizure was unlawful because officers lacked reasonable suspicion of drug activity when Klare searched her (dog had already failed to alert). | Klare: officers developed reasonable suspicion from obscured plate, traffic violations, and tools in van; Harris forfeited some arguments below. | Reversed district court: factual dispute (e.g., timing of dog sniff) permits jury to find seizure unlawful. |
| Whether Harris voluntarily consented to the search | Harris: consent was coerced/not unequivocal given age (17), length of detention, armed officers, hands secured, and implied threat that refusal denied restroom access. | Klare: Harris acquiesced/consented (nonverbal conduct like walking where directed) and a reasonable officer could believe consent was given. | Court: a reasonable jury could find consent involuntary under totality of circumstances. |
| Whether Klare is entitled to qualified immunity for the search | Harris: the unlawfulness was clearly established; reasonable officers should know prolonged detention/search without consent is unconstitutional. | Klare: she reasonably relied on facts/reports and may not have known dog had cleared vehicle or extent of suspicion; reasonable mistake of fact shields her. | Court: factual disputes (what Klare knew about the dog and suspicion) preclude qualified immunity on summary judgment; jury may find no reasonable mistake. |
| Whether there is controlling precedent denying qualified immunity here | Harris: prior cases (e.g., Beauchamp) show similar coercive consent contexts, so Clake had fair notice. | Klare: differences in facts and possible reasonable mistakes counsel immunity. | Court: existing authority (Beauchamp and others) makes it plausible a reasonable officer would know the conduct unlawful; jury must resolve fact questions. |
Key Cases Cited
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (voluntariness of consent assessed from totality of circumstances)
- Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (consent coerced by assertion of lawful authority is invalid)
- Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (consent tainted by illegal seizure)
- United States v. Ivy, 165 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 1999) (factors for evaluating consent and detainee characteristics)
- United States v. Beauchamp, 659 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2011) (consent involuntary where officer frisk/search began and suspect not told right to refuse)
- United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 2005) (drug-dog non-alert can dispel reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Bailey, 302 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 2002) (traffic stop ends when original purpose completed; further detention requires new reasonable suspicion)
- Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (qualified immunity demands materially similar precedent to deny immunity)
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014) (qualified immunity standard: whether reasonable officer would know conduct unlawful)