597 F.Supp.3d 574
S.D.N.Y.2022Background
- Plaintiff Jessica Bristol began working for Securitas in April 2016 and acknowledged receipt of Securitas’s Dispute Resolution Agreement during onboarding; the Agreement stated it applied whether or not the employee signed the acknowledgement and designated arbitration as the parties' exclusive forum for employment disputes.
- The Agreement is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, covers all employment-relationship disputes, specifies that the parties should select an arbitrator by mutual agreement, allows a court to appoint an arbitrator if the parties cannot agree, and limits the arbitration location to within 45 miles of the employee’s last worksite absent written agreement otherwise.
- In 2019 Bristol had a high-risk pregnancy and provided a physician’s note restricting prolonged standing; she alleges Securitas failed to provide a sitting post or reasonable accommodation, causing harm to her and her child.
- Bristol sued under Title VII, the ADA, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law; Securitas moved to compel arbitration under the FAA, and Bristol conceded issues about scope but challenged the Agreement as indefinite and contended she did not knowingly waive a jury trial.
- Magistrate Judge Gorenstein granted Securitas’s motion to compel arbitration and stayed the action (Apr. 11, 2022), holding the Agreement sufficiently definite (court appointment of an arbitrator and FAA gap-filling render it enforceable), rejecting Bristol’s separate jury-waiver argument, and denying Securitas’s request for sanctions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enforceability / Definiteness of arbitration agreement | Agreement is too indefinite—fails to specify arbitrator, forum, rules, choice of law | Agreement provides selection process, court appointment fallback, FAA fills procedural gaps | Agreement is enforceable; selection and location provisions plus FAA fill gaps |
| Validity of jury-trial waiver | Bristol did not knowingly and voluntarily waive jury trial; apply Morgan four-factor test | Jury waiver is inherent in arbitration; conventional arbitration standards govern | Court refused to apply stand-alone jury-waiver test and enforced waiver as part of arbitration agreement |
| Request for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 / inherent power | N/A (opposed) | Securitas sought sanctions for counsel’s alleged bad faith filing despite Agreement | Denied—no clear and convincing evidence of counsel bad faith required for such sanctions |
Key Cases Cited
- Ross v. American Express Co., 547 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2008) (FAA reflects strong federal policy favoring arbitration)
- Vera v. Saks & Co., 335 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2003) (courts must enforce arbitration agreements to encourage arbitration)
- JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2004) (four-step framework for motions to compel arbitration)
- Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1983) (doubts about arbitrability resolved in favor of arbitration)
- Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg., Inc., 487 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007) (discusses unenforceability of mere agreement-to-agree)
- Abdullayeva v. Attending Homecare Servs. LLC, 928 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2019) (state contract-law principles govern formation of arbitration agreements)
- Bensadoun v. Jobe-Riat, 316 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary-judgment–style standard applies to motions to compel arbitration)
- Katz v. Cellco Partnership, 794 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 2015) (stay proper when all claims are referred to arbitration)