Briggs v. State
560 S.W.3d 176
Tex. Crim. App.2018Background
- On Oct. 14, 2010, Sandra Coy Briggs struck a pickup stopped on the highway, killing SAN ANTONIO police officer Sergio Antillon; officers detected alcohol and she refused breath/blood. A warrant was not obtained and a blood draw was performed about three hours after the crash, showing BAC 0.14 g/dL.
- Briggs pled no contest to intoxication manslaughter of a peace officer on Jan. 12, 2012, waiving the right to a jury on guilt/innocence and reserving punishment to the jury; jury assessed 45 years.
- No pretrial motion to suppress the blood evidence was filed; trial counsel advised Briggs the blood would be admissible under Texas implied-consent/mandatory-draw statutes and relevant precedent then in force.
- After later developments in law (notably Missouri v. McNeely and Texas cases including Villarreal), Briggs moved for a new trial arguing her 2012 plea was involuntary because counsel misrepresented the admissibility of the blood evidence.
- The trial court denied the motion, finding McNeely applied retroactively but that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless draw under the totality of the circumstances; the court of appeals reversed, holding counsel’s pre-McNeely advice rendered the plea involuntary.
- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court: a plea knowingly and voluntarily made under the law existing at the time is not invalidated by later judicial developments absent misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Briggs's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Briggs's 2012 no-contest plea was involuntary because counsel misadvised her about the admissibility of a warrantless blood draw | Counsel misrepresented admissibility under the Transportation Code; after McNeely/Villarreal the blood would be inadmissible, so plea was not voluntary | A plea voluntarily made under then-existing law is not vitiated by later judicial changes; no suppression motion was filed and no ineffectiveness or state misconduct shown | Plea was voluntary; later changes in law (McNeely/Villarreal) do not retroactively render a plea involuntary when advice matched controlling law at the time and no misconduct occurred |
| Whether McNeely and subsequent cases require vacatur of a plea entered before those decisions | McNeely clarified that natural metabolization is not a per se exigency; thus prior advice that implied-consent/mandatory-draw statutes authorized warrantless draws was erroneous and plea must be set aside | McNeely and progeny do not invalidate pleas entered knowingly under prior precedent; Brady/McMann principles control; if no suppression ruling was sought, plea stands | McNeely and later cases do not affect voluntariness of Briggs's 2012 plea under these facts |
| Whether retroactive application of McNeely necessitates reversal because Briggs’s appeal was not final | Briggs: Case was not final (out-of-time appeal), so McNeely and progeny apply and show counsel misadvised her | State: Even if McNeely retroactive, voluntariness is judged by law then existing and subsequent changes do not undo a valid plea | Court treated McNeely as retroactive but held it irrelevant to voluntariness of plea made under then-controlling law |
| Whether absence of a pretrial suppression motion changes the analysis | Briggs: Not directly argued, but appellate court viewed voluntariness separate from suppression issue | State: Procedural posture matters—without a suppression ruling, McNeely-based suppression analysis is not before the court | Court emphasized procedural posture: no suppression motion was filed, so voluntariness must be judged by counsel’s advice under existing law at plea time |
Key Cases Cited
- Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (natural metabolization of alcohol is not a per se exigency; exigency determined case-by-case)
- Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (later judicial decisions do not render a voluntary plea invalid if made under then-applicable law)
- McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (a defendant assumes risk of ordinary error in counsel’s legal assessment when pleading guilty)
- State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (mandatory-blood-draw/implied-consent provisions do not authorize warrantless nonconsensual blood draws absent a Fourth Amendment exception)
- Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (discussion that implied-consent statute had been treated as permitting warrantless blood draws under certain interpretations)