Briggs v. Magness
2016 Ark. App. 576
| Ark. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Belle Pointe Subdivision (Little Rock) was developed in 1989 with an original plat and bill of assurance showing Lots 1–32, Tract A (between Lots 25/26 at the north cul‑de‑sac), Tract B, and a contiguous 40‑acre tract to the north.
- The original bill of assurance described a common‑drive easement for ingress/egress "within the area shown on the Plat" and stated Tract A "shall remain open space until combined with other land to make a buildable residential lot" with city approval.
- The subdivision was replatted in 1993; the property owners’ improvement district filed a restated and amended bill of assurance that reaffirmed easements shown on the original plat but stated the original made no dedication of public right‑of‑way and reiterated that Tract A shall remain open space until combined to form a buildable residential lot with Planning Commission approval.
- Briggs contracted to buy Tract A plus the contiguous 40 acres to create a new development (BPVE) and proposed using Tract A for a private gated drive to access BPVE from Belle Pointe.
- Belle Pointe lot owners sued for declaratory relief; the trial court granted summary judgment for the owners, holding the restated bill of assurance limited Tract A to a single residential use and prohibited use as an access roadway to another subdivision; no easement across Tract A authorized Briggs’s proposed access.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Briggs) | Defendant's Argument (Lot Owners) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether restrictive covenants allow Tract A to be used as a private access drive to Briggs’s adjacent development | Restated covenants don’t clearly prohibit a private drive; the "unfettered use" rule favors Briggs | Restated bill explicitly limits Tract A to open space until combined to make a single residential lot and restricts non‑residential structures/uses | Court: Tract A limited to residential use; road to another subdivision inconsistent with covenant, so prohibited |
| Whether the original bill of assurance granted an easement across Tract A to the 40‑acre tract north | Original bill granted ingress/egress easement including to Tract A and the 40 acres, permitting the proposed common drive | Any easement was limited to the area shown on the original plat (which stops at the cul‑de‑sac) and conflicts with the open‑space restriction | Court: Even if original intended an easement, the restated instrument extinguished any such easement; no easement now authorizes access across Tract A |
| Proper application of the "unfettered use" (strict construction) rule to construe the covenants | Briggs: ambiguous restraints should be resolved in favor of unfettered use permitting the drive | Lot owners: plain language of the restated bill limits Tract A and must control; restrictions are clear and govern | Court: Applied strict construction but followed plain meaning of restated covenants; restrictions were clear and enforceable |
Key Cases Cited
- Royal Oaks Vista, LLC v. Maddox, 372 Ark. 119 (2008) (restrictive covenants are strictly construed and doubts resolved for unfettered land use)
- Cochran v. Bentley, 369 Ark. 159 (2007) (party intent in covenant language governs; restrictions must be clearly apparent)
- Windsong Enters., Inc. v. Upton, 366 Ark. 23 (2006) (clear, unambiguous covenant language confines parties to its plain meaning)
- Holaday v. Fraker, 323 Ark. 522 (1996) (strict construction rule limited by taking plain meaning of language)
- Briarwood Apartments v. Lieblong, 12 Ark. App. 94 (1984) (using a lot as a street to access non‑subdivision property is not a residential use incidental to the covenant)
- Riffle v. Worthen, 327 Ark. 470 (1997) (burden to prove existence of an easement rests on the claimant)
- Wilson v. Johnston, 66 Ark. App. 193 (1999) (an express easement should identify its location with specificity)
- Sluyter v. Hale Fireworks P’ship, 370 Ark. 511 (2007) (easements may be extinguished by subsequent events or express terms of later instruments)