Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District
476 Mass. 298
Mass.2017Background
- Annie Dookhan, a chemist at the William A. Hinton State Laboratory, admitted extensive misconduct (dry-labbing, contaminating samples, falsifying logs and QC checks) that potentially tainted drug testing in tens of thousands of cases. State investigations identified >40,000 potentially affected tests and prosecutors compiled lists of ~20,000 defendants possibly entitled to relief.
- This litigation follows prior SJC decisions (Scott, Bridgeman I, Francis, Ruffin) that: (1) recognized Dookhan’s conduct as egregious government misconduct; (2) created a narrow, conclusive presumption of egregious misconduct for defendants whose cases included a drug certificate signed by Dookhan as primary/confirmatory chemist (the “relevant Dookhan defendants”); but (3) did not adopt a global vacatur remedy and left prejudice (second Ferrara prong) to individual adjudication.
- The single justice obtained lists from district attorneys and oversaw an initial notice mailing to ~21,000 recipients that produced an extremely low defendant response (≈20 defense motions; prosecutors filed ~175 motions to vacate/dismiss). The notice was criticized as inadequate in content, translation, and delivery method.
- Petitioners (including CPCS) urged a global remedy (vacate convictions with prejudice or vacate without prejudice and impose a one‑year reprosecution window). District attorneys urged continued case‑by‑case adjudication and defended the initial notice and process.
- The Court declined the global remedy but recognized the existing process as impracticable without modification. It ordered a three‑phase protocol: (1) DA review and mass culling—DAs must identify Ruffin (ineligible) cases, vacate/dismiss with prejudice convictions they will not or cannot reprosecute, and certify remaining cases they could reprosecute on evidence independent of Dookhan; (2) court‑approved, improved notice and streamlined opt‑in with CPCS hotline/indigency form and active efforts to locate unserved defendants; (3) CPCS assignment of counsel for indigent opt‑ins, and if CPCS cannot timely assign counsel despite best efforts, the single justice may fashion relief (including dismissal without prejudice) to remedy right‑to‑counsel violations.
- The SJC emphasized prosecutorial duty to notify, the limited and last‑resort role of dismissal with prejudice, defendants’ right to appointed counsel in these postconviction proceedings under the special circumstances, and the requirement that DAs bear notice costs. The single justice was empowered to supervise implementation and adjust the protocol if impracticable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a global vacatur/remedy is required to vindicate due process for thousands of Dookhan‑tainted convictions | Petitioners: global vacatur (with prejudice) or vacatur without prejudice with a one‑year reprosecution deadline is necessary because case‑by‑case relief is impracticable and initial notice was inadequate | DAs: case‑by‑case adjudication is fair and workable; global vacatur is an overbroad abandonment of criminal‑justice fundamentals | Court rejected global remedy; adopted modified case‑by‑case protocol with mandated DA pruning, better notice, and counsel assignment procedures |
| Adequacy of DA notice and obligation to notify affected defendants | Petitioners: DA notice was misleading, poorly translated, and failed to inform defendants of conclusive presumption, right to counsel, or how to pursue relief | DAs: notice was fair; low response shows many defendants do not wish to reopen cases | Court found DA notice inadequate and ordered new court‑approved notice and additional outreach methods; DAs must bear costs |
| Whether indigent relevant Dookhan defendants are entitled to appointed counsel for motions to vacate or for new trials | Petitioners: CPCS lacks capacity; but indigent defendants are nonetheless entitled to counsel; systemic failures justify broader relief | DAs: appointment decisions generally left to motion judges; resources limit assignments | Court ordered CPCS assignment of counsel to all indigent relevant Dookhan defendants who opt in; if CPCS cannot timely assign despite best efforts, single justice may provide remedies (including dismissal without prejudice) to remedy denial of counsel |
| Proper use of dismissal with prejudice as remedy for government misconduct | Petitioners: global dismissal with prejudice justified by systemic scale and delay | DAs: dismissal with prejudice is extraordinary and unjustified where retrial can cure harm | Court reaffirmed dismissal with prejudice is a last resort; DAs must proactively dismiss cases they will not or cannot reprosecute, but broad, court‑ordered mass dismissal was declined; dismissal without prejudice remains a possible remedy where counsel is unavailable |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336 (recognizing Dookhan’s misconduct as egregious and creating a conclusive presumption of egregious government misconduct for affected defendants)
- Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 465 (Bridgeman I) (declining a global remedy earlier and remanding for further proceedings)
- Commonwealth v. Francis, 474 Mass. 816 (extending the conclusive‑misconduct consequence to convictions at trial where Dookhan’s certificates were admitted)
- Commonwealth v. Ruffin, 475 Mass. 1003 (holding the conclusive presumption does not apply where the plea preceded Dookhan’s signed certificate)
- Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278 (1st Cir.) (two‑prong test for vacating pleas for government misconduct: egregious misconduct and materiality/prejudice)
- Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 442 Mass. 228 (remedying systemic right‑to‑counsel shortages by setting dismissal rule when counsel not timely assigned)
- Commonwealth v. Cronk, 396 Mass. 194 (explaining that dismissal with prejudice is a remedy of last resort and outlining principles for its application)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (discussing prosecutors’ disclosure duties and role in ensuring fairness)
