Briana Cash v. Interscope Geffen A and M Records
2:22-cv-01900
C.D. Cal.Jul 22, 2024Background
- Plaintiff Briana Cash is an independent musician who has used the name "Briana Cash" since at least 2008 and owns a federal trademark for this name, registered in December 2020.
- Defendant Brianna Castro, also a musician, performed under the similar stage name "Brianna Cash" and signed with Interscope Records in 2017, using the name until 2020.
- In May 2020, Cash first demanded UMG (Interscope's parent) stop using "Brianna Cash"; by late 2020, UMG/Defendants began transitioning Castro's music to the name "Brianna Castro."
- Cash filed suit in March 2022 alleging trademark infringement, unfair competition, and related claims under both federal and common law, seeking corrective advertising as her measure of damages.
- Defendants counterclaimed for declaratory relief, arguing Castro’s use of "Brianna Cash" did not infringe the plaintiff’s rights.
- The case is before the court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, challenging both Cash’s claims and seeking judgment on their counterclaim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Entitlement to damages for corrective advertising | Cash suffered damage to her mark requiring corrective ads | Cash presented no admissible evidence of damages or loss of value to her mark | Summary judgment for Defendants; Cash's claim fails for lack of evidence on damages |
| Validity and secondary meaning of Cash's trademark | Mark has secondary meaning through use, streaming, and professional affiliations | Mark lacks secondary meaning; no evidence consumers associate her name with her music | Genuine dispute exists; summary judgment inappropriate |
| Likelihood of confusion between "Briana Cash" and "Brianna Cash" | Substantial similarity and instances of actual confusion established | No likelihood of confusion; differences in musicians’ notoriety and genres | Genuine dispute exists; summary judgment inappropriate |
| Defendants’ entitlement to declaratory judgment of non-infringement | Not applicable | Defendants’ use is non-infringing due to lack of secondary meaning/confusion | Summary judgment denied; factual disputes preclude judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (sets standard for summary judgment; disputes must be material and genuine)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (moving party’s initial burden in summary judgment)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (non-moving party must show genuine factual issues)
- Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2005) (secondary meaning is a question of fact)
- Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985) (lists factors for establishing secondary meaning)
- Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 2001) (likelihood of confusion is a factual question)
- Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc’s B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1987) (standard for likelihood of confusion in trademark law)