Brian Williams v. United States, 875 F.3d 803

Background

Brian Williams pled guilty (2006) to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and received a 15‑year mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on three prior Ohio convictions (including attempted felonious assault).
Williams filed a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion after Johnson v. United States (Johnson II) invalidated the ACCA residual clause and Welch made that rule retroactive. He argued his Ohio felonious assault conviction no longer qualified as an ACCA predicate.
A prior Sixth Circuit published precedent, United States v. Anderson, 695 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2012), held Ohio felonious assault necessarily requires violent physical force and thus qualifies under the ACCA elements (force) clause.
The district court concluded Anderson still controlled and denied Williams relief; the Sixth Circuit panel affirmed, holding it was bound by Anderson and could not overrule it.
Concurring judge agreed the panel was bound by Anderson but argued Anderson should be reconsidered en banc; the dissent argued intervening Supreme Court decisions (notably Mathis) require reanalysis and would undermine Anderson.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Williams’ Ohio attempted felonious assault conviction qualifies as a "violent felony" under the ACCA elements (force) clause	Williams: Ohio statute can be satisfied by causing serious mental illness (non‑physical harm), so it does not necessarily require violent physical force and cannot qualify under the elements clause after Johnson II	Government: Anderson is binding and held the Ohio felonious assault statute necessarily requires violent physical force, so the conviction qualifies under the elements clause regardless of residual‑clause changes	Panel: Bound by Anderson; conviction qualifies under elements clause; Williams not entitled to § 2255 relief
Whether Johnson II (invalidating the residual clause) entitles Williams to relief	Williams: With the residual clause gone, his predicate convictions may no longer support ACCA enhancement	Government: Even without the residual clause, the enhancement stands because at least one conviction qualifies under the elements clause per Anderson	Panel: Johnson II is irrelevant here because Anderson establishes a separate, valid basis for the ACCA enhancement
Whether Anderson has been undermined by later Supreme Court decisions (Mathis, Descamps) so this panel can or should overrule it	Williams: Mathis/Descamps require divisibility analysis and suggest Anderson’s categorical holding is suspect because the Ohio statute covers nonphysical harms	Government: Mathis/Descamps do not change Anderson’s dispositive holding that both prongs require physical force; this panel is bound by Anderson	Panel: Mathis/Descamps do not provide a basis to overrule Anderson; only en banc Sixth Circuit or Supreme Court could do so
Whether United States v. Perry conflicts with Anderson and requires rejecting Anderson	Williams: Perry’s residual‑clause analysis implies Anderson is suspect	Government: Perry addressed the residual clause; it did not overrule or reject Anderson’s elements‑clause holding	Panel: No conflict—Perry does not undermine Anderson; both can stand

Key Cases Cited

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause)
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (Johnson II rule is retroactive on collateral review)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (explained divisibility/modified categorical approach and the elements/means distinction)
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (limited use of the modified categorical approach to divisible statutes)
United States v. Anderson, 695 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2012) (held Ohio felonious assault necessarily requires violent physical force and qualifies under ACCA elements clause)
United States v. Perry, 703 F.3d 906 (6th Cir. 2013) (analyzed Ohio felonious assault under the ACCA residual clause)