Brian Towne v. Karen Donnelly, 44 F.4th 666

Background

Brian Towne served as LaSalle County State’s Attorney (2006–2016); Karen Donnelly defeated him in the 2016 election after prior interactions (internship, unsuccessful job application).
After taking office Donnelly opened an investigation into Towne; Towne alleges investigators fabricated evidence, concealed exculpatory material, and induced a grand jury indictment in Sept. 2017.
A special prosecutor was appointed but took no action; after roughly ten months of inaction Towne moved to dismiss for violation of his speedy-trial right and the state court dismissed all charges in Aug. 2019.
Towne filed a § 1983 suit in July 2020 alleging First Amendment retaliatory prosecution, Fourth Amendment unlawful detention, due-process fabricated-evidence, conspiracy, and related state-law claims.
Defendants moved to dismiss as time-barred; the district court held the First Amendment claim accrued at indictment (Sept. 2017) and dismissed the federal claims as untimely; it declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.
On appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that First Amendment retaliatory-prosecution claims accrue when the retaliatory charges are brought and that McDonough v. Smith did not alter that rule.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does a First Amendment retaliatory-prosecution claim accrue for statute-of-limitations purposes?	Towne: accrual requires favorable termination (i.e., dismissal/acquittal), relying on McDonough.	Defs: accrual occurs when retaliatory charges are filed (indictment); limitations runs then.	Accrual occurs when retaliatory charges are brought (indictment); McDonough does not extend favorable-termination to First Amendment claims.
Does McDonough v. Smith require favorable termination for retaliation claims like it does for fabricated-evidence due-process claims?	Towne: McDonough’s rationale (malicious-prosecution analogy; pragmatic concerns) applies and mandates favorable-termination.	Defs: McDonough is limited to due-process/fabricated-evidence claims closely analogous to malicious prosecution.	Rejected extension; Court distinguished retaliation claims from malicious-prosecution/fabrication claims and declined to impose favorable-termination.
When does a Fourth Amendment claim for pretrial detention accrue; does Thompson v. Clark change that?	Towne: Thompson may require favorable-termination accrual for Fourth Amendment claims and thus revive his claim.	Defs: accrual occurs when detention ends; Towne conceded his Fourth Amendment claim was untimely under existing law.	Towne conceded untimeliness; Court enforced the concession and did not reopen the claim despite Thompson.
Are equitable tolling or estoppel available to delay accrual where retaliatory motive is concealed?	Towne: tolling/estoppel could apply if he could not discover retaliatory motive.	Defs: no sufficient basis shown to toll or estop.	Court recognized tolling/estoppel doctrines in principle but found no basis to apply them here; accrual at indictment stands.

Key Cases Cited

McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149 (2019) (fabricated-evidence due-process §1983 claims accrue only after favorable termination; analogized to malicious prosecution)
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (accrual when plaintiff has "a complete and present cause of action")
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (limits collateral attacks on criminal judgments; informs malicious-prosecution analogies)
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006) (First Amendment retaliatory-prosecution claims require pleading lack of probable cause and but-for causation)
Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332 (2022) (supreme court clarified favorable-termination requirement for Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claims)
Gekas v. Vasiliades, 814 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 2016) (accrual governed by when plaintiff knows or should know rights were violated)
FKFJ, Inc. v. Village of Worth, 11 F.4th 574 (7th Cir. 2021) (elements of First Amendment retaliation claim explained)