Brian L. Paquette v. State of Indiana, 101 N.E.3d 234

On Feb. 2, 2016 Brian Paquette fled from a marked Indiana State Police cruiser on I‑69 by driving on the wrong side of the highway; his vehicle later collided with other cars.
The collision killed three people (two passengers and an unborn child) and killed one other motorist when Paquette’s vehicle struck and flipped onto that motorist’s car.
The State charged Paquette with multiple counts, including three counts of Level 3 felony resisting law enforcement (one count tied to each deceased victim) based on Indiana Code § 35‑44.1‑3‑1(b)(3).
Paquette pleaded guilty but reserved the right to challenge whether multiple resisting convictions could be entered for a single act of fleeing; the trial court convicted on three felony resisting counts and imposed consecutive sentences.
The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, relying on Armstead v. State, holding the resisting statute authorizes only one conviction per act of resisting; the State sought transfer.
The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and held subsection (b) is an enhancement of the subsection (a) offense and does not authorize separate felony convictions for each person killed by a single act of resisting.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Indiana Code § 35‑44.1‑3‑1 permits multiple felony resisting convictions when a single act of fleeing in a vehicle causes multiple deaths	The State: § 35‑44.1‑3‑1(b)(3) permits separate convictions for each victim killed by the vehicle during the flight	Paquette: The statute authorizes only one resisting conviction per discrete act of resisting; multiple convictions violate that statutory structure (and Paquette reserved statutory argument)	Court: Subsection (b) is an enhancement of the subsection (a) resisting offense; only one resisting conviction is allowed per single act of resisting, even if multiple deaths result
Applicability of Armstead precedent	The State: Armstead addressed harms to officers and is inapplicable to multiple civilian deaths under current (b)(3) language	Paquette: Armstead’s logic applies because resisting is an offense against the State’s authority, not individual victims	Court: Armstead applies; resisting is an offense against State authority and its reasoning extends to (b)(3) enhancements
Remedy and sentencing	The State: multiple convictions and consecutive sentences were proper	Paquette: only one resisting conviction should stand; sentencing must be revised	Court: Reverse two of three felony resisting convictions; remand for revised sentencing and for entering convictions under other statutes that expressly authorize multiple convictions where applicable (e.g., OVI causing death)

Armstead v. State, 549 N.E.2d 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (held resisting law enforcement is an offense against State authority and supports single‑conviction rule for a discrete act)
Paquette v. State, 79 N.E.3d 932 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (Court of Appeals decision reversing multiple resisting convictions and remanding for resentencing)
Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. 2006) (statutory structure can limit multiple convictions for harms resulting from a single act)
Indiana Alcohol & Tobacco Comm’n v. Spirited Sales, LLC, 79 N.E.3d 371 (Ind. 2017) (courts may not add words to a statute; statutory text controls construction)
Kitchell v. Franklin, 997 N.E.2d 1020 (Ind. 2013) (courts cannot engraft new words or restrictions onto statutes)