Brian Hejda v. Bell Container Corporation
160 A.3d 741
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | 2017Background
- Brian Hejda, a Teamsters member and Bell Container CDL driver, injured his knee at work in August 2012 and received medical restrictions (no kneeling/squatting, must wear knee brace, unable to drive a company vehicle).
- Bell refused to allow Hejda to drive pending DOT recertification under 49 C.F.R. §§ 391.41, 391.43, 391.45; Hejda declined an employer-scheduled independent medical exam and later provided DOT medical certificates from Dr. Goldberg.
- The union grieved under the CBA; an arbitrator denied the grievance and held Hejda on medical layoff until DOT recertification was obtained.
- Hejda filed administrative and state-court claims alleging (1) retaliatory discharge under the Workers’ Compensation Law (WCL) for filing a workers’ compensation claim and (2) disability discrimination/failure to accommodate under the Law Against Discrimination (LAD).
- Bell moved to dismiss, arguing both state-law claims were pre-empted by § 301 of the LMRA because resolution would require interpreting the CBA; the trial court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
- The Appellate Division reversed, holding Hejda’s WCL retaliation and LAD disability claims do not require interpretation of any CBA provision and therefore are not pre-empted by § 301.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hejda’s WCL retaliatory-discharge claim is pre-empted by § 301 | Hejda: claim is an independent state-law tort (retaliation for filing workers’ compensation) and can be resolved by purely factual inquiry without interpreting the CBA | Bell: resolution requires analyzing CBA provisions (e.g., reinstatement/just‑cause, medical layoff rules) so § 301 pre-empts the claim | Not pre-empted — WCL claim rests on factual issues of motive and discharge; no CBA interpretation required (Lingle/Hawaiian Airlines framework) |
| Whether Hejda’s LAD disability-discrimination and failure‑to‑accommodate claims are pre-empted by § 301 | Hejda: LAD creates independent rights and his allegations (disabled/perceived disabled, qualified with/without accommodation, failure to engage in interactive process) do not depend on CBA interpretation | Bell: CBA and DOT-related provisions (e.g., Article 35; layoff/recertification rules) make the claims dependent on the CBA and thus pre-empted | Not pre-empted — LAD claims present purely factual inquiries about disability, qualification, and discrimination; DOT rules are federal and CBA need not be construed to decide LAD issues |
| Whether the employer’s DOT recertification requirement makes the claims contingent on the CBA | Hejda: recertification requirement stems from federal DOT regulations, not from the CBA, so resolution relies on federal regs and factual proof, not CBA interpretation | Bell: CBA provisions regarding examinations and management rights tie the recertification issue to the CBA, requiring interpretation | Court: DOT requirements are regulatory and straightforward; any interpretation of those federal rules is separate from CBA interpretation and does not trigger § 301 pre-emption |
| Whether a CBA-based defense alone requires § 301 pre-emption of independent state claims | Hejda: a CBA-based defense does not convert independent state-law claims into § 301 actions | Bell: existence of CBA remedies/rights means federal law should govern | Court: a CBA-based defense is ordinarily insufficient to pre-empt an independent state-law claim; pre-emption arises only if resolution requires interpreting the CBA (per Lingle/Hawaiian Airlines/Puglia) |
Key Cases Cited
- Puglia v. Elk Pipeline, 226 N.J. 258 (N.J. 2016) (state-law whistleblower claim not pre-empted by § 301 where claim is independent of CBA)
- Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (U.S. 1994) (state tort claims involving employer motive are not pre-empted where they require only factual inquiry, not CBA interpretation)
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399 (U.S. 1988) (§ 301 pre-emption applies only when state-law claim requires interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement)
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (U.S. 1985) (state-law contract-based claims substantially dependent on a CBA must be treated as § 301 claims)
- Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448 (U.S. 1957) (§ 301 creates federal-law body to enforce collective-bargaining agreements)