967 F.3d 380
4th Cir.2020Background
- Brian Farabee, with severe, long‑standing mental illness, was found not guilty by reason of insanity in 1999 and civilly committed; he had prior malicious‑wounding convictions with a suspended 2000 sentence.
- In 2015 Virginia sought revocation of the suspended sentence based on misconduct at Central State Hospital and a 2003 conviction; Dr. Nelson (file‑review) opined Farabee was competent and the state court scheduled revocation hearings.
- Farabee's court‑appointed attorney, Linda Tomlin, allegedly failed to communicate, investigate, or prepare defenses and Farabee twice sought substitute counsel; he was found competent and, after a surprise second amended violation letter, his suspended sentence was revoked and he was ordered to serve prison time.
- Farabee pursued state habeas relief (denied) and then three federal habeas petitions; the district court dismissed them (including treating one §2254 as successive), and Farabee appealed.
- The Fourth Circuit consolidated the appeals and granted COA on four questions: right to counsel in revocation, due process claims (notice/delay/incarceration), excuse of procedural default, and whether the second §2254 was improperly treated as successive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Farabee) | Defendant's Argument (Virginia/VDOC) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Right to counsel at revocation | Farabee argued he raised timely, colorable, and complex mitigation/affirmative defenses (mental‑health, medication, self‑defense) that required counsel to develop | Virginia argued revocation was based on an undisputed prior conviction and no complex mitigating circumstances existed; no due process right to counsel | Court held Farabee had a due process right to counsel under Gagnon because he raised timely, colorable, and complex claims difficult for a lay, mentally ill litigant to develop |
| Adequate notice of revocation basis | Farabee claimed he lacked actual notice of the second amended violation (2003 conviction) because counsel failed/abandoned him and thus he was surprised at the final hearing | Virginia contended notice to counsel satisfied due process | Court held Farabee sufficiently pled inadequate notice: counsel’s near‑abandonment meant notice to counsel did not equal notice to client |
| Undue delay in seeking revocation | Farabee argued Virginia waited over a decade after the 2003 conviction to seek revocation, causing prejudice by eroding witnesses/records | Virginia argued timing was within prosecutorial discretion and prior conviction removed prejudice concerns | Court held the decade delay was plausibly unreasonable and prejudicial, so Farabee adequately alleged an undue‑delay due process claim |
| Substantive due process re: confinement/medical care and procedural default / successive petition | Farabee alleged state failed to provide recommended treatment (DBT), repeatedly reincarcerated him, and that procedural defaults should be excused for cause/prejudice and miscarriage of justice; second §2254 was filed before adjudication of the first | Virginia argued conditions claims belong in §1983, defaults/bar, and the second §2254 was successive | Court held Farabee adequately pled substantive due process claims about treatment/conditions (Youngberg/McNair line), established plausible cause and prejudice (and potential miscarriage of justice) to excuse defaults, and the district court erred treating the second §2254 as successive since the earlier petition was not adjudicated on the merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (establishes due‑process/counsel framework for probation/parole revocation)
- Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (advance written notice is required so the charged party can marshal a defense)
- Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606 (probationer entitled to present mitigating evidence at revocation)
- Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (attorney abandonment may negate attribution of counsel’s acts to client)
- United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (presumed prejudice from total failure of counsel)
- Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (substantive due‑process rights of involuntarily committed persons to adequate care and safety)
- Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (limited reading of “second or successive” in habeas context)
- Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (miscarriage‑of‑justice gateway for excusing procedural default)
- McNair v. McCune, 527 F.2d 874 (4th Cir.) (habeas jurisdiction to review segregation/conditions‑of‑confinement due‑process claims)