Brian E. Graves v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 16A01-1703-PC-600

Background

On Feb. 7, 2010 Graves was stopped by an Indiana State Trooper, fled after being identified on warrants, struggled with the trooper, injured the trooper’s finger as his truck left, and later led officers on a chase; he was convicted of Escape (Class B), Resisting Law Enforcement (Class D), and found to be a habitual offender.
Graves was tried in Decatur County after related conduct led to charges and conviction in Shelby County; he received an aggregate sentence (habitual-offender enhancement later vacated).
Graves directly appealed his convictions; this Court affirmed and the Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer.
Graves filed a post-conviction petition asserting, among other claims, ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failing to successfully raise that the Decatur prosecution was a prohibited successive prosecution under Indiana law.
The post-conviction court vacated the habitual-offender enhancement but otherwise denied relief; Graves appealed the denial as to the ineffectiveness claim concerning successive prosecution.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise successive-prosecution claim	Graves: counsel failed to preserve or fully press that Decatur prosecution was barred as a successive prosecution under I.C. § 35-41-4-4	State: trial counsel did move to dismiss on double jeopardy/successive-prosecution grounds and argued the claim at hearing	Denied — trial counsel did raise and litigate the claim; mere lack of success does not establish ineffectiveness
Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising successive-prosecution on appeal	Graves: appellate counsel should have argued Decatur charges should have been joined with Shelby charges as part of same scheme or plan	State: appellate counsel’s selection of issues was strategic; facts mirrored prior cases where separate prosecutions were permitted	Denied — decline to raise was a reasonable strategic choice; omitted issue was not clearly stronger than those raised
Whether the Decatur Escape was part of the same scheme or plan as Shelby resisting offense (statutory joinder/successive-prosecution question)	Graves: offenses arose from one continuous event and should have been charged together	State: facts show multiple jurisdictions and distinct acts separated by pursuit and time/distance	Denied — facts more like Johnson (separate offenses across jurisdictions) than Williams (single scheme); statutory requirement to have charged together not satisfied
Whether Graves was prejudiced by counsel's omission (Strickland prejudice prong)	Graves: omission likely changed outcome; would have barred Decatur prosecution	State: no reasonable probability result would differ given factual record and controlling precedent	Denied — no prejudice shown because the successive-prosecution claim was unlikely to succeed

Key Cases Cited

Williams v. State, 762 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 2002) (charges based on closely connected acts forming a single scheme must be joined and successive prosecution barred)
Johnson v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (separate resisting offenses across multiple counties with separation in time/distance are distinct and not subject to joinder)
Sanders v. State, 914 N.E.2d 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (lengthy chase with distinct pursuits treated as separate offenses like Johnson)
Graves v. State, 981 N.E.2d 58 (Ind. 2013) (direct appeal affirming Graves’s convictions)
Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677 (Ind. 2017) (post-conviction standard of review and burden)
McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389 (Ind. 2002) (Strickland-based ineffective-assistance standard applied in Indiana)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-part ineffective assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706 (Ind. 2007) (standards for appellate counsel ineffectiveness; strategic issue selection afforded deference)