Brewington, S. v. Phila. Sch. Dist., Aplt.
199 A.3d 348
| Pa. | 2018Background
- Nine-year-old Jarrett Brewington ran a relay in gym class at Walter G. Smith Elementary, tripped, and collided with an unpadded concrete gym wall; he sustained a concussion and long-term symptoms.
- Mother sued the School District alleging the concrete wall was a defective/dangerous condition and the School negligently failed to install padding (safety mats).
- Trial court granted summary judgment for the School, reasoning mats are personalty and thus outside the Act’s "real property" exception to governmental immunity, relying on Rieger.
- Commonwealth Court (en banc) reversed, holding the analysis should focus on the cause of injury (the unpadded wall) not the nature of protective equipment, and reaffirming Singer while disapproving Rieger.
- Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed: failure to pad a gym wall can constitute negligent care, custody, or control of real property under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, so governmental immunity does not bar the suit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether failure to pad a gym wall falls within the Act's real property exception | Brewington: injury caused by real property (concrete wall); failure to add padding is negligence in care/custody/control | School: injury resulted from supervision/teacher direction and a trip (not a defect of the wall); mats are personalty so exception doesn't apply | Held: Real property exception applies — focus on cause (the wall) not on personalty used as remedy; pleadings allege negligent care of real property |
| Whether the real property exception requires an affirmative act (versus failure to act) | Brewington: omission (failure to install padding) qualifies as an "act" under the Act | School: exception applies only to affirmative acts caring for real property | Held: The Act’s definition of "act" includes failure to act; omission can trigger the exception |
| Whether allegations of negligent supervision preclude application of the real property exception | Brewington: complaint pleads negligent care of property, not supervision; even if supervision alleged, it does not bar independent real-property claim | School: injury caused by negligent supervision (teacher), so immunity applies | Held: Negligent supervision is distinct; it does not bar a properly pleaded independent claim that the real property condition caused the injury |
| Whether Blocker/Rieger limit recovery when protective chattel (mats) are personalty | Brewington: focus on cause of injury (realty) — protective chattel’s status irrelevant | School: Blocker/Rieger hold nonaffixed chattels are personalty and cannot trigger exception | Held: Blocker stands for the proposition that personalty causing injury may not trigger the exception, but Mascaro/Singer line supports focusing on the realty that caused harm; Rieger is disapproved insofar as it misapplied Blocker |
Key Cases Cited
- Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 305 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1973) (background on legislative response abrogating judicial governmental immunity)
- Singer v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 513 A.2d 1108 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (real property exception applied where unprotected floor — not the mat — caused injury)
- Blocker v. City of Philadelphia, 763 A.2d 373 (Pa. 2000) (chattel not affixed to realty is personalty and generally does not trigger real property exception)
- Rieger v. Altoona Area Sch. Dist., 768 A.2d 912 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (held personalty/mats outside real property exception — disapproved here)
- Mascaro v. Youth Study Ctr., 523 A.2d 1118 (Pa. 1987) (held real property exception unavailable where claim was characterized as negligent supervision/facilitation of third-party harm; distinguished and criticized in this opinion)
- Grieff v. Reisinger, 693 A.2d 195 (Pa. 1997) (recognized that negligent care of property, including omissions, can fall within real property exception)
- Cagey v. Commonwealth, 179 A.3d 458 (Pa. 2018) (statutory definition of "act" includes failure to act; cited for that principle)