29 F.4th 721
6th Cir.2022Background:
- Bretton Westmoreland, a pretrial detainee at Butler County Jail (BCJ), was labeled a “rat” by another inmate (Jerry St. Clair); his mother called the jail expressing concern.
- Jail coordinator McMillin documented the mother’s call and gave Rocky Tyree (a jailer) a note to follow up; Tyree says he had already asked Westmoreland and was told he did not want to move; Westmoreland disputes that conversation occurred.
- Westmoreland later asked Deputy Kidd to move him; Kidd declined. Shortly after midnight on June 4, 2018, inmate Ricky Mullikan assaulted Westmoreland, fracturing his jaw and causing lasting injury.
- Westmoreland sued Tyree and BCJ under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to protect (Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments) and asserted state-law claims; the district court granted summary judgment to defendants, finding no constitutional violation (no subjective knowledge) and dismissing state claims.
- The Sixth Circuit majority vacated and remanded, holding that post-Kingsley and under Brawner the subjective prong must be modified to an objective/recklessness standard for pretrial detainees’ failure-to-protect claims; municipal liability depends on whether an individual constitutional violation is found.
- Judge Bush dissented, arguing Kingsley does not extend to failure-to-protect claims (especially inaction), warning the majority’s Castro-style four-part test is vague, risks collapsing to negligence, and would not change the outcome on these facts.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicable standard for pretrial-detainee failure-to-protect claims | Kingsley requires objective standard; Brawner modifies deliberate-indifference subjective prong to recklessness | Continue applying Farmer subjective deliberate-indifference standard | Majority: apply Brawner/Kingsley modification — subjective prong becomes objective/recklessness; vacate and remand |
| Whether Tyree violated detainee’s constitutional rights / qualified immunity | Tyree acted with reckless disregard by not taking reasonable measures after notice; qualified immunity not appropriate | No constitutional violation shown; even if, law was not clearly established => qualified immunity | Court vacated summary judgment and remanded for application of the objective/recklessness test; qualified immunity to be decided after that analysis |
| Municipality (BCJ) liability under Monell | BCJ liable if an employee’s constitutional violation caused injury (policy/custom) | No underlying constitutional violation; no municipal liability | Vacated dismissal of BCJ; municipal liability contingent on whether individual violation proven on remand |
| Disposition of state-law claims | State claims should proceed alongside federal claims | District court properly dismissed state claims after summary judgment on federal claims | Vacated dismissal of pendent state claims; remanded for further proceedings if federal claim survives |
Key Cases Cited
- Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015) (pretrial-detainee excessive-force claims judged by an objective-unreasonableness standard)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference test: objective risk + subjective awareness)
- Brawner v. Scott County, Tennessee, 14 F.4th 585 (6th Cir. 2021) (Sixth Circuit holds Kingsley requires modifying the subjective prong for pretrial detainees to an objective/recklessness standard)
- Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. en banc 2016) (formulated a four-part objective/recklessness test for pretrial-detainee failure-to-protect/inaction claims)
- Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983 requires a policy or custom causing the constitutional violation)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity: two-step inquiry — constitutional violation and clearly established law)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity shields officials unless they violate clearly established rights)
- Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2001) (recognizes that being labeled a snitch places an inmate at substantial risk of harm)