481 P.3d 596
Wash. Ct. App.2021Background
- In 2018 Edmonds enacted Ordinance No. 4120 (ECC 5.26.010–070), making it a civil infraction to store an unsecured firearm and to allow minors/at-risk/prohibited persons to obtain a firearm; fines $500–$10,000.
- Voters passed Initiative 1639 (2018), which also criminalizes certain unsafe storage that permits access by prohibited persons.
- Three Edmonds residents (Gun Owners) sued under the UDJA seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging RCW 9.41.290 preempts the Ordinance.
- The trial court held plaintiffs had standing to challenge the storage provision (ECC 5.26.020) but not the unauthorized-access provision (ECC 5.26.030), granted summary judgment invalidating ECC 5.26.020, and enjoined its enforcement.
- On appeal the Court of Appeals held the Gun Owners have standing to challenge both provisions and that RCW 9.41.290 unambiguously preempts both ECC 5.26.020 and ECC 5.26.030.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to bring a pre-enforcement UDJA challenge to ECC 5.26.030 (unauthorized-access) | Gun Owners: UDJA permits a challenger whose rights are adversely affected; their storage practices and fear of enforcement confer standing; alternatively issue is of broad public import. | City: Plaintiffs lack standing because they do not intend to violate ECC 5.26.030 and therefore suffer no injury in fact. | Court: Plaintiffs have standing to challenge both provisions; broad-public-import and Alim precedent support pre-enforcement review. |
| Whether RCW 9.41.290 preempts local regulation of firearm storage (ECC 5.26.020) | Gun Owners: RCW 9.41.290 fully occupies the field of firearms regulation, which includes possession/storage; local storage ordinance is preempted. | City: The statute’s illustrative list does not mention “storage,” so storage falls outside the preempted field; any ambiguity should favor ordinance validity. | Court: RCW 9.41.290 unambiguously preempts storage regulation; “including” is illustrative and possession (and thus storage) falls within the preempted field. |
| Whether RCW 9.41.290 preempts prohibitions on allowing access by minors/ prohibited persons (ECC 5.26.030) | Gun Owners: Provision regulates possession/transfer and is within the preempted field. | City: Ordinance addresses access/unauthorized possession and can coexist with state law; ambiguity resolves for municipal power. | Court: ECC 5.26.030 is also preempted as it regulates possession/transfer and falls within the state-occupied field. |
Key Cases Cited
- Alim v. City of Seattle, 14 Wn. App. 2d 838 (2020) (UDJA standing in pre-enforcement challenge to similar storage ordinance)
- Walker v. Munro, 124 Wn.2d 402 (1994) (standing doctrine and UDJA limits)
- Diversified Indust. Dev. Corp. v. Ripley, 82 Wn.2d 811 (1973) (justiciability and UDJA require direct, substantial interests)
- Jametsky v. Olsen, 179 Wn.2d 756 (2014) (statutory interpretation and de novo review)
- Watson v. City of Seattle, 189 Wn.2d 149 (2017) (RCW 9.41.290 does not preempt taxes because tax is not a firearm "regulation")
- Cherry v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 116 Wn.2d 794 (1991) (preemption clause does not reach internal employment rules)
- Pacific Northwest Shooting Park Ass'n v. City of Sequim, 158 Wn.2d 342 (2006) (local permit conditions may be authorized under statutory carve-outs)
- Kitsap County v. Kitsap Rifle & Revolver Club, 1 Wn. App. 2d 393 (2017) (local shooting-range permit requirement not preempted under facts presented)