Breton v. Comm'r of Corr.
196 A.3d 789
| Conn. | 2018Background
- Randy Breton committed violent offenses in 2011, pleaded nolo contendere in March 2013, and was sentenced on August 22, 2013 to an effective 20-year term plus special parole.
- In 2011 the legislature enacted § 18-98e (risk reduction credits) and amended Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125a(b)(2) so that earned risk reduction credits would reduce a violent offender's definite sentence and advance initial parole eligibility.
- On July 1, 2013 the legislature amended § 54-125a(b)(2) (P.A. 13-3, § 59) to remove earned risk reduction credit from the parole-eligibility calculation, requiring violent offenders to serve 85% of the definite sentence before parole eligibility.
- Breton had earned the maximum risk reduction credits available by the habeas trial; departmental witnesses testified the credits are routinely posted and forfeited only for misconduct.
- The habeas court dismissed Breton’s ex post facto challenge as speculative because credits are discretionary and revocable; the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding retroactive application of the 2013 amendment to Breton violates the federal ex post facto clause and directing judgment for the petitioner.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether retroactive application of the 2013 amendment to § 54-125a(b)(2) violates the federal ex post facto clause | Breton: The 2013 amendment removes earned risk reduction credits from the initial parole-eligibility calculation, retroactively increasing his punishment because he was entitled to application of credits under the law in effect when he committed his crimes | Commissioner: No ex post facto violation because credits are discretionary, may be revoked, and thus any increased punishment is speculative; parole is not part of the sentence for due process purposes | Held for Breton: Retroactive removal of credits from the parole-eligibility formula creates a sufficient risk of increased punishment and violates the ex post facto clause when applied to offenses committed before the amendment. |
| Whether the discretionary and revocable nature of risk reduction credits defeats Breton's ex post facto claim | Breton: Even if credits are discretionary, the law in effect at the time of the offense mandated that earned credits be applied to advance parole eligibility; he has earned credits and there is no reason to expect forfeiture | Commissioner: Discretion and forfeiture mean any extension of confinement is speculative and attenuated (citing Morales reasoning) | Held for Breton: Discretion does not displace ex post facto protection; proven routine awarding and Breton’s accumulated credits make the risk of increased incarceration genuine, not speculative. |
Key Cases Cited
- Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (original formulation of ex post facto prohibition)
- Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981) (retroactive reduction of good-time credits violates ex post facto clause)
- Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997) (Weaver principles applied to retroactive revocation of overcrowding credits)
- California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995) (statute delaying subsequent parole reconsideration did not present sufficient risk of increased punishment)
- Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530 (2013) (test: whether change in law creates sufficient risk of increasing punishment)
- Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653 (1974) (parole eligibility is part of the law annexed to the crime)
- United States v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993) (federal circuits follow that altered parole-eligibility rules enacted after offense cannot be applied to defendant to his disadvantage)