Brent Vinson v. Vermilion County, Illinois, 776 F.3d 924

Background

Vinsons sued Sherrick, Shaw, and Davis in their individual capacities, and Walsh, Hartshorn, and two counties in their official/indemnification capacities for a warrantless search of the Vinsons’ home and attached garage.
Earlier, detectives searched the Olson home with no Vinson involvement or Vinson warrant, then contacted local deputies to conduct a subsequent Vinson home search.
On June 4, 2009, plainclothes officers arrived at the Vinsons’ home, initiated a search of the curtilage and attached garage, and CA.V observed an officer peering through a window and asserting a need to search.
CA.V alerted her mother; the family alleges no express or implied consent to search; CA.V allegedly complied with the officer’s statement, not a request for consent.
The district court dismissed or severed various claims as untimely or insufficient under Twombly/Iqbal, and held there was consent and no Fourth Amendment violation; the court also found lack of Monell/liability against counties.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, reinstating Fourth Amendment claims against the officers and the county defendants, and remanding for further proceedings; trespass claims were not addressed and not reversed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Vinsons state a plausible Fourth Amendment claim for a warrantless search of curtilage/garage.	Vinson asserted no consent; officers entered protected areas and peered inside without lawful authority.	District court concluded CA.V’s compliance constituted consent; argued no Fourth Amendment violation.	Fourth Amendment claims reinstated; search not clearly consensual.
Whether the complaint plausibly alleges lack of consent to search.	Allegations show no express/requested consent; CA.V did not authorize search; officer’s conduct violated curtilage.	Complaint alleged CA.V complied, implying consent; district court found consent as a matter of law.	Complaint plausibly alleges lack of consent; does not show valid consent.
Whether the county defendants can be liable under 745 ILCS 10/9-102 and Monell theories.	County indemnification liability and possible Monell liability for county police actions.	No Monell claim adequately pleaded; indemnification rests on underlying Fourth Amendment claims.	Indemnification claims reinstated; Monell liability not necessary to reach remand on Fourth Amendment claims.
Whether the time-bar issues affect the Vinsons’ newly filed complaint after severance.	Severance treated claims as filed separately; original filing date controls; timely amended complaint.	Severance could render new complaint untimely; however, the court treated severed actions as timely from the original filing date.	Statute of limitations not a barrier on remand; timing resolved in favor of Vinsons.

Key Cases Cited

Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (U.S. 2013) (curtilage protected as part of the home for Fourth Amendment purposes)
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (home-right to retreat from unreasonable official intrusion)
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (U.S. 1984) (curtilage within Fourth Amendment protections)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1973) (consent as an exception to warrant requirement)
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (U.S. 1946) (consent as a recognized exception to search)
Randolph v. United States, 547 U.S. 103 (U.S. 2006) (consent authority limits, especially by a child)
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (U.S. 1978) (no respondeat superior liability under §1983 for municipalities)
Lee v. Cook County, Ill., 635 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2011) (severed claims proceed as if filed separately; timeliness considerations)
Ball v. City of Indianapolis, 760 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2014) (novel pleading standards under Twombly/Iqbal for §1983)
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (U.S. 2007) (proper pleading standard; notice pleading requirements)