513 P.3d 971
Cal.2022Background
- Brennon B., a developmentally disabled special-education student, alleged multiple sexual assaults by classmates and a school aide while enrolled at De Anza High School in West Contra Costa Unified School District.
- His guardian sued the District (among others) asserting negligence and a claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code § 51) seeking statutory penalties and attorney fees.
- The trial court sustained the District’s demurrer to the Unruh claim, ruling a public school district is not a “business establishment”; the Court of Appeal denied Brennon’s writ petition and the California Supreme Court granted review.
- The Supreme Court framed three core questions: (1) whether public school districts are “business establishments” under § 51(b); (2) whether § 51(f) (the 1992 ADA incorporation) makes any ADA violation an Unruh violation; and (3) whether Education Code § 201(g) (1998 amendment) incorporates Unruh remedies into the Education Code.
- The Court held that public school districts, when providing free public education, are not “business establishments” under § 51(b); § 51(f) makes ADA violations actionable under Unruh only where the violator is a business establishment; the Education Code incorporation argument was not adopted here and was not resolved on the merits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a public school district is a “business establishment” under Civ. Code § 51(b) | § 51’s phrase “all business establishments of every kind whatsoever” is broad enough to include public schools | Public schools carry out a constitutional public duty, not commercial transactions, and thus are not business establishments | Not a business establishment when performing core educational functions; Unruh does not apply |
| Whether § 51(f) makes any ADA violation (by any entity) also a violation of Unruh | § 51(f) incorporated the ADA into Unruh so any ADA violation (including by public entities) is an Unruh violation | § 51(f) incorporates ADA protections only insofar as ADA violations concern business establishments/public accommodations | § 51(f) means ADA violations by business establishments/public accommodations are Unruh violations; it does not eliminate the “business establishment” limitation |
| Whether Education Code § 201(g) makes Unruh remedies (statutory penalties/fees) available against school districts | § 201(g) allows Education Code remedies to be combined with Unruh remedies, effectively importing Unruh penalties into education claims | The 1998 amendment did not intend to convert school districts into business establishments or import Unruh remedies against them | Court declined to adopt Brennon’s incorporation theory and did not decide the remedy-incorporation issue on the merits in this case |
| Whether plaintiff could amend to cure the Unruh pleading defect | Amend if possible to allege facts bringing the district within Unruh or invoke Education Code remedies | District: demurrer sustained correctly; appeal moot after settlement | Moot/declined to decide (parties settled); court did not reach amendability question |
Key Cases Cited
- Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 10 Cal.4th 594 (Cal. 1995) (framework for deciding when a nontraditional entity qualifies as a “business establishment” under Unruh)
- Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 17 Cal.4th 670 (Cal. 1998) (Unruh covers businesslike transactions, not expressive/charitable membership decisions)
- Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 46 Cal.4th 661 (Cal. 2009) (discussing § 51(f) and the relationship between Unruh and the ADA)
- Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation, 39 Cal.4th 1164 (Cal. 2006) (distinguishing statutes that expressly include public entities and noting Unruh’s coverage of private business establishments)
- Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., 57 Cal.2d 463 (Cal. 1962) (broad interpretation of “business” in Unruh context)
- O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn., 33 Cal.3d 790 (Cal. 1983) (nonprofit entity subject to Unruh where it functions as a commercial enterprise)
- Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal.3d 72 (Cal. 1985) (Unruh prevents private facilities open to public from excluding protected classes)
- Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal.3d 65 (Cal. 1990) (Unruh does not apply to employment discrimination)
- Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal.3d 493 (Cal. 1970) (Unruh scope limited to businesses furnishing goods, services, or facilities)
- Bass v. County of Butte, 458 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (federal court analysis concluding § 51(f) incorporates only ADA provisions germane to Unruh’s original subject matter)