Brennan v. Travelers Home and Marine Insurance Company
59 N.E.3d 905
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- Anne Flanagan owned and insured a car with Travelers; after her death her daughter Megan and son-in-law Marty continued using the car and paying premiums; title transferred to Megan in June 2014.
- Marty had an accident in October 2014; Travelers denied coverage, and the Brennans sued Travelers.
- Travelers moved to dismiss under 735 ILCS 5/2-619, arguing the policy terminated upon Flanagan’s death; the circuit court dismissed the complaint with prejudice on June 18, 2015.
- The same day the Brennans filed a "Motion to Reconsider" asking only for leave to file an amended complaint (adding conversion and reliance-based claims) and asking the court to "reconsider its dismissal with prejudice."
- The circuit court denied the motion on October 2, 2015; the Brennans filed a notice of appeal on October 6, 2015 and challenged both the June 18 dismissal and the denial of leave to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the postjudgment motion tolled the 30-day appeal period from the June 18, 2015 final dismissal | The motion to reconsider (seeking leave to amend and asking court to "reconsider its dismissal with prejudice") tolled the appeal period so the October notice was timely | Under Fultz, a motion for leave to amend is not a motion "directed against the judgment" and thus does not extend the appeal period | Motion did not toll the appeal period; appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review the June 18 dismissal |
| Whether the appellate court may review the denial of leave to file an amended complaint | The denial of leave to amend is reviewable and the proposed new claims should be allowed | Even if reviewable, the amendment sought was improper because it sought new facts/claims not merely to conform pleadings to proof | Appellate court has jurisdiction to review the denial of leave to amend, but denial was proper because the requested amendments were not limited to making pleadings conform to proofs |
| Proper standard for a postjudgment motion to extend appeal time | Motions that effectively seek reinstatement or vacation of the "with prejudice" dismissal qualify as postjudgment motions under Kingbrook and Muirfield Village | Fultz remains controlling: a bare motion for leave to amend does not qualify; postjudgment motions must be directed against the judgment | Fultz controls; motions solely seeking leave to amend do not extend the appeal period; Kingbrook does not overrule Fultz |
| Whether the proposed amendments (conversion, reliance/promissory estoppel) could be advanced after final judgment | Plaintiffs contend they can plead additional facts to show reliance and conversion | Under postjudgment amendment rules, new causes of action or new parties cannot be added after final judgment; amendments must conform pleadings to proofs | Proposed amendments were improper postjudgment additions and denial of leave to amend was affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Fultz v. Haugan, 49 Ill. 2d 131 (1971) (motion for leave to file amended complaint is not a motion directed against the judgment and does not extend appeal time)
- Kingbrook, Inc. v. Pupurs, 202 Ill. 2d 24 (2002) (postjudgment motions need not include specificity to qualify as motions directed against judgment)
- Muirfield Village-Vernon Hills, LLC v. K. Reinke, Jr. & Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d 178 (2004) (motion to reinstate plus leave to amend deemed postjudgment because it sought reinstatement/vacatur of the dismissal)
- Shutkas Electric, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 366 Ill. App. 3d 76 (2006) (applies Fultz principle that amendment motions do not toll appeal period)
- Mandel v. Hernandez, 404 Ill. App. 3d 701 (2010) (postjudgment amendments must generally be limited to making pleadings conform to proofs)