Brenmor Props., LLC v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of Lisbon
161 A.3d 545
| Conn. | 2017Background
- Brenmor Properties applied under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-30g for a 19-lot affordable housing subdivision on a 12.92-acre parcel in Lisbon; 18 homes, six deed-restricted for moderate-income households.
- Interior access for most lots was via a private internal roadway (characterized by plaintiff as a common driveway) that did not meet Lisbon’s roadway ordinance minimum width and maximum grade requirements.
- The commission denied the initial and modified § 8-30g submissions, citing noncompliance with the town road ordinance and the State Fire Prevention Code; town staff and the fire marshal expressed safety concerns, while plaintiff submitted traffic/safety expert testimony asserting safe access for residents and emergency vehicles.
- The Superior Court sustained Brenmor’s appeal, holding that noncompliance with the road ordinance and the fire code were not valid grounds to deny the § 8-30g application, and directed the commission to grant the application as submitted.
- The Appellate Court affirmed, concluding that municipal road standards may be considered but deviations are not per se grounds for denial under § 8-30g, and that the record did not show harm to public safety outweighing the need for affordable housing; it also upheld the trial court’s directed grant as not an abuse of discretion.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court granted certification, adopted the Appellate Court’s opinion as controlling, and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether noncompliance with municipal road ordinance is a valid ground to deny a § 8-30g application | Roadway deviations do not create a safety risk; expert testimony shows safe ingress/egress and emergency access | Town argued road ordinance noncompliance (width/grade) justified denial to protect public safety | Deviation from town road standards can be considered but is not a per se ground for denial under § 8-30g; here record did not show sufficient safety harm |
| Whether noncompliance with state fire code justified denial | Plaintiff disputed that fire marshal showed specific, case-based analysis of the modified plan or demonstrated substantial public-safety harm | Commission relied on fire marshal’s concerns under the fire code to deny approval | Trial court properly discounted the fire marshal’s general letter regarding the modified proposal; fire code concerns alone did not justify denial absent record evidence of concrete harm |
| Appropriate standard and scope of judicial remedy when commission unlawfully denies § 8-30g application | Plaintiff sought directed grant of the application as submitted, arguing remand would be futile given record | Commission argued remand should be required so conditions could be considered; raised general usurpation-of-function concerns | Abuse of discretion is the review standard for a trial court’s decision to direct approval “as is”; here directed grant was not an abuse of discretion given the record and commission’s concessions |
| Whether town ordinance or case law required deference to municipal judgment absent analytical data | Plaintiff: municipal legislative judgment cannot trump § 8-30g balancing absent demonstrated harm | Commission invoked precedents endorsing deference to legislative safety judgments and lack of bright-line analysis | Court distinguished rational-basis facial challenge cases; § 8-30g requires a particularized balancing test—town judgment does not automatically prevail without record evidence of specific harm |
Key Cases Cited
- River Bend Associates, Inc. v. Zoning Comm’n, 271 Conn. 1 (2004) (sets § 8-30g balancing framework and standards for evaluating substantial public interest vs. need for affordable housing)
- AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Zoning Comm’n, 284 Conn. 124 (2007) (observes that remedies in § 8-30g appeals may be more expansive than in ordinary land-use appeals)
- Bogue v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 165 Conn. 749 (1974) (traditional principle limiting courts from directing administrative action unless only one reasonable outcome exists)
- Blue Sky Bar, Inc. v. Stratford, 203 Conn. 14 (1987) (rational-basis review in facial challenges to municipal safety ordinances)
- Cormier v. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles, 105 Conn. App. 558 (2008) (addresses deference to legislative safety judgments in equal protection context)
