Brenda Gilbert v. Kenyatta K. Stewart, Esq. (084860) (Bergen County & Statewide), A-32-20

Background

Brenda Gilbert, a long‑time Passaic County Senior Probation Officer, was summoned in 2014 for numerous municipal charges issued while her ex‑husband used a vehicle still registered in her name.
Kenyatta Stewart, the ex‑husband’s attorney, entered appearances for both Gilbert and Monroe, advised Gilbert to plead guilty (to reduce impact on Monroe), and she pled guilty to fines and community service; the convictions were later vacated on PCR.
Gilbert did not immediately report the municipal matters to her employer; an internal investigation after the WPMC disposition uncovered other unreported matters and a prior license suspension.
The Vicinage charged Gilbert with failure to report and lack of candor, resulting in a negotiated settlement: a demotion and fifty days’ suspension without pay.
Gilbert filed an ethics complaint (Stewart received an admonition for conflict of interest and failing to memorialize fees) and sued Stewart for legal malpractice, alleging his dual representation, advice to plead guilty, and failure to warn of employment consequences proximately caused her employment sanctions.
The trial court and Appellate Division granted summary judgment for Stewart, concluding Gilbert’s failure to report—not Stewart’s conduct—was the proximate cause; the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding a jury could find Stewart’s breach was a substantial factor in Gilbert’s harm.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Stewart’s professional negligence proximately caused Gilbert’s employment sanctions	Stewart’s dual representation, advice to plead guilty, and failure to warn caused a “domino effect”; but for his conduct there would have been no conviction to report	Gilbert’s own failure to timely and truthfully report the matters was the proximate cause; the convictions themselves did not drive discipline	A jury could reasonably find Stewart’s breach was a substantial factor in Gilbert’s harm; proximate‑cause is for the factfinder here (summary judgment reversed)
Whether Gilbert’s post‑plea reporting failures were an intervening, sole cause that defeats causation	Conklin‑type defense inapplicable where attorney’s duty includes preventing client’s self‑harm; Gilbert testified she would have declined the plea if warned	Gilbert knowingly delayed reporting and volunteered to perform community service through her church; these acts break the causal chain	The Court held the substantial‑factor test applies; client conduct does not automatically sever causation when client relied on attorney’s advice
Applicability of the substantial‑factor test in legal malpractice cases	Gilbert: substantial‑factor test applies and supports jury determination	Stewart: the facts are undisputed and show client conduct alone produced the harm	The Court reaffirmed that the substantial‑factor test is appropriate and that proximate cause is ordinarily for the jury
Appropriateness of summary judgment on proximate cause	Gilbert: disputed inferences (e.g., whether she knew about community service) preclude summary judgment	Stewart: undisputed facts justify judgment as a matter of law	The Court reversed summary judgment because reasonable inferences favoring Gilbert permit a jury to find proximate cause

Key Cases Cited

Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 145 N.J. 395 (1996) (explains substantial‑factor test and that professionals must prevent client self‑inflicted harm; client reliance can preserve causation)
Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36 (2015) (causation is typically a factfinder issue; only in extraordinary cases may it be decided as a matter of law)
Komlodi v. Picciano, 217 N.J. 387 (2014) (discusses foreseeability and application of the substantial‑factor test for concurrent causes)
Lamb v. Barbour, 188 N.J. Super. 6 (App. Div. 1982) (plaintiffs failed to show they would have been deterred absent alleged negligent advice; no proximate cause)