666 S.W.3d 369
Tenn. Ct. App.2022Background
- On November 21, 2016 a Durham-employed school bus driver lost control of a bus carrying 37 Woodmore Elementary students; six children died and many were injured.
- Brenda Cothran, the Woodmore principal, sued Durham (employer) for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), reckless infliction of emotional distress (RIED), and breach of a promise to pay counseling; she alleged she arrived minutes after the crash, saw injured/deceased children, and assisted at the hospital.
- Cothran alleged Durham knew of repeated warnings about driver Johntony Walker’s dangerous driving but failed to correct, discharge, or train him (including alleged cell‑phone use while driving).
- Durham moved to dismiss for failure to state NIED and RIED claims; the trial court denied the motion as to both claims; Durham obtained an extraordinary (Rule 10) appeal.
- The Court of Appeals reversed: (1) Cothran did not plead the close/intimate relationship required for a non‑bystander NIED claim under Eskin, and (2) her RIED allegations failed because they did not plead outrageous conduct and she was not within the reasonably foreseeable class of plaintiffs under Doe.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Cothran stated a prima facie NIED claim (non‑bystander) | Cothran alleged she arrived minutes after the crash, saw injured/deceased children, and was in loco parentis / spent more time with children than parents, satisfying Eskin’s relationship and proximity elements | Durham argued Cothran did not allege the requisite close/intimate familial‑type relationship and was not a witness to the injury‑producing event | Reversed — complaint fails as a matter of law: allegations do not establish the close/intimate relationship required for a non‑bystander NIED claim under Eskin |
| Whether Durham’s alleged conduct was sufficiently outrageous to state RIED | Durham’s inaction despite warnings created an intolerable risk to children and is outrageous as a matter of law | Durham argued the allegations describe poor management or negligence, not the extreme/atrocious conduct required for RIED | Reversed — allegations are generalized and lack the particularized, extreme facts required to plead outrageous conduct |
| Whether Cothran was within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the risk for RIED liability | Cothran argued Durham knew staff would be emotionally impacted and she was foreseeably harmed | Durham argued Cothran was not the immediate subject of the risk, did not witness the crash, and is not within the class for whom emotional harm was highly probable | Reversed — as a matter of law Cothran is not a reasonably foreseeable plaintiff under Doe’s foreseeability limitation |
Key Cases Cited
- Eskin v. Bartee, 262 S.W.3d 727 (Tenn. 2008) (defines elements for non‑bystander NIED: close/intimate relationship and observation at scene before material alteration)
- Doe 1 ex rel. Doe 1 v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville, 154 S.W.3d 22 (Tenn. 2005) (RIED need not be directed at plaintiff but recovery limited to persons within the reasonably foreseeable scope of the risk)
- Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196 (Tenn. 2012) (explains general NIED elements and serious emotional injury requirement)
- Lourcey v. Estate of Scarlett, 146 S.W.3d 48 (Tenn. 2004) (application of foreseeability factors and recovery where plaintiff witnessed violent act)
- Ramsey v. Beavers, 931 S.W.2d 527 (Tenn. 1996) (foreseeability factors for emotional‑distress claims include awareness and physical location during event)
- Medlin v. Allied Inv. Co., 398 S.W.2d 270 (Tenn. 1966) (establishes high, ‘‘outrageous conduct’’ standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress)