Breitburn Energy Partners LP
16-11390
Bankr. S.D.N.Y.Jan 2, 2018Background
- Dorothy Mae Cooley filed two proofs of claim (Nos. 2053 and 2405) in the Breitburn chapter 11 cases asserting royalty rights derived from her father Raymond Cooley.
- The Court entered a Memorandum Decision (Aug. 18, 2017) and an Expunging Order (Sept. 11, 2017) disallowing and expunging those Cooley claims.
- Cooley submitted a timely pro se filing objecting to the Expunging Order; the Court treated it as a motion for a new trial or to alter/amend under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (Bankr. R. 9023) or for reargument under Local Rule 9023-1.
- Cooley’s arguments rested on two factual/legal premises: (1) the Michigan divorce court’s 1993 allocation of oil/gas/mineral royalties between Raymond (60%) and his then-spouse Jean (40%) was invalid or tainted by fraud/contempt; and (2) Raymond’s will/estate should have left his entire royalty share to Cooley alone, not divided among siblings.
- Cooley sought essentially to collaterally attack Michigan court rulings and to relitigate state-court determinations rather than claim underpayment by the Debtors; the Court declined to revisit those state-court orders and denied her motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Cooley’s submission warrants reargument/alteration of the Expunging Order | The Court overlooked controlling facts and law showing the Michigan divorce award and related probate disposition were invalid and that she is entitled to all royalties | Debtors argue the Expunging Order was correct; Cooley’s contentions attack state-court rulings and do not show error in the bankruptcy court’s decision | Denied — movant failed to show the Court overlooked controlling decisions/facts or clear error; reargument standards are strict |
| Whether the bankruptcy court may reexamine Michigan court divorce and probate determinations (collateral attack) | Cooley asks the Court to invalidate the Michigan divorce/allocation and Raymond’s will to award her sole entitlement | Debtors contend the bankruptcy court will not relitigate or collaterally attack final state-court orders; Cooley does not assert Debtors underpaid if state rulings stand | Denied — court will not look behind Michigan courts’ rulings; collateral attack improper in this proceeding |
Key Cases Cited
- 539 B.R. 66, In re Campbell (539 B.R. 66) (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (Rule 59(e) standards govern motions for reargument under local bankruptcy rules)
- 290 B.R. 55, In re Randall’s Island Family Golf Ctrs., Inc. (290 B.R. 55) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Rule 59(e) standards apply in bankruptcy reargument context)
- 46 F. Supp. 3d 310, Perez v. Progenic Pharm., Inc. (46 F. Supp. 3d 310) (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (movant must show court overlooked controlling decisions or facts or correct clear error to justify reconsideration)
- 332 B.R. 520, In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd. (332 B.R. 520) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (reargument standards and need to prevent manifest injustice)
- 72 F. Supp. 2d 365, Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Petrojam, Ltd. (72 F. Supp. 2d 365) (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (criteria for reconsideration construed strictly to avoid repetitive arguments)
- 861 F. Supp. 2d 262, Liberty Media Corp. v. Vivendi Universal, S.A. (861 F. Supp. 2d 262) (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (reargument is not a vehicle for new arguments or rehearing on the merits)
- 156 F.3d 136, Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp. (156 F.3d 136) (2d Cir. 1998) (motion for reconsideration is not a second bite at the apple)
