Breen v. Mineta
253 F. Supp. 3d 244
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs were FAA Flight Service (FS) specialists terminated in an October 3, 2005 RIF after the FAA outsourced the FS function to Lockheed following an A-76 competitive sourcing process.
- The FAA decided to subject the FS function to A-76 amid declining FS workload (automation, pilots using online tools), budget pressures, and the Bush Administration’s Competitive Sourcing Initiative and PMA goals.
- Grant Thornton performed feasibility work; FAA held a formal competition in 2004 between an in-house Most Efficient Organization (MEO) and private bidders; Lockheed won and the FAA issued RIF notices in July 2005.
- Plaintiffs asserted (1) disparate treatment under the ADEA (intentional age discrimination) and (2) disparate impact (neutral policy disproportionately affecting workers 40+).
- The district court denied summary judgment on disparate treatment (finding genuine issues of material fact on motive and pretext, notably widespread management references to an “aging/retirement-eligible workforce” and procedural irregularities), but granted summary judgment for defendants on disparate impact (RIF/A-76 treated as a one-time decision, not a repeatable neutral policy).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the RIF/outsourcing decision constituted disparate treatment (intentional age discrimination) | Plaintiffs say the FAA targeted FS because of age; point to repeated references to an “aging/retirement-eligible workforce,” procedural irregularities, and handicapping of the MEO as evidence of discriminatory motive and pretext | FAA says the RIF applied to all FS specialists, was driven by legitimate business reasons (declining workload, cost savings, PMA mandates), and age-related comments were either not by decisionmakers or were legitimate observations | Denied summary judgment for defendants on disparate treatment — factual disputes (comments, inconsistent explanations, and procedural issues) preclude resolution at summary judgment |
| Whether plaintiffs can maintain a disparate impact claim based on the A-76/RIF process | Plaintiffs identify the A-76 process and core/non-core designations as neutral practices causing disparate impact on workers 40+ | FAA argues the A-76/RIF was a one-time decision and not a facially neutral, repeatable employment practice that disparate-impact doctrine targets | Granted summary judgment for defendants on disparate impact — court concluded plaintiffs failed to isolate a specific, repeatable policy or practice (A-76/RIF was a one-time decision) |
| Scope of actionable adverse employment action — can plaintiffs challenge antecedent decisions leading to RIF? | Plaintiffs view the A-76 decision, FAIR inventory/core designation, and other antecedent decisions as relevant to discriminatory motive | Defendants argue only the RIF is an adverse employment action and antecedent business decisions are not actionable personnel actions | Court held the RIF is the operative adverse action but antecedent decisions are admissible as evidence of motive and pretext |
| Causation standard for federal ADEA claims (but-for vs. age-as-factor) | Plaintiffs rely on Ford (D.C. Cir.) allowing proof either that age was but-for cause or that age was a factor in a personnel action under 29 U.S.C. § 633a | Defendants urged Gross’s but-for standard (from § 623 private- sector cases) | Court applies Ford: because this is a federal-employer claim under § 633a, plaintiffs may show age was a factor (not necessarily strict but-for) — relevant to remedies (but-for needed for back pay per Ford) |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard) (summary judgment requires no genuine dispute of material fact)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (prima facie and burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (private ADEA claims require but-for causation)
- Ford v. Mabus, 629 F.3d 198 (D.C. Cir.) (federal-employer ADEA claims under § 633a may be proved by showing age was a factor; but-for needed for certain remedies)
- Aliotta v. Bair, 614 F.3d 556 (D.C. Cir.) (discusses disparate-impact and RIF context for ADEA claims)
- Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (disparate-impact doctrine requires identification of a specific, repeatable policy or practice; one-time decisions are typically not disparate-impact targets)