934 F.3d 1
1st Cir.2019Background
- Breda was a Verizon Wireless customer from 2003 until 2015, when she ported her number to Republic Wireless and began using Republic’s “Wi‑Fi + Cell Talk + Text” plan.
- Republic’s service is hybrid: it routes incoming calls via VoIP when the phone is on Wi‑Fi and via third‑party cellular networks (Sprint or T‑Mobile) when not on Wi‑Fi; Breda’s phone sometimes received calls over cellular networks.
- After porting, Breda received automated, prerecorded calls from Verizon; she told Verizon to stop but calls continued. Republic’s records confirm some of Verizon’s calls were delivered via cellular networks.
- Breda sued under the TCPA, alleging Verizon used an autodialer/artificial or prerecorded voice to call a telephone number “assigned to a . . . cellular telephone service.”
- The district court denied Verizon’s motion to compel arbitration but granted summary judgment for Verizon, holding Breda’s service was VoIP (not “cellular telephone service”) and her number was listed as “wireline” on Neustar.
- The First Circuit affirmed denial of arbitration but reversed summary judgment, holding Breda’s hybrid service counts as a “cellular telephone service” and Neustar’s listing was not dispositive of “assigned to.”
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Breda’s TCPA claims are subject to arbitration under her expired Verizon agreement | Breda argued her TCPA claims arise from post‑agreement conduct and are not grounded in the expired Verizon contract | Verizon argued Breda linked her claim to services provided under the Agreement and thus arbitration should apply | Court: Denied arbitration — claims arise after expiration and do not have their real source in the contract; stray references to Verizon do not compel arbitration |
| Whether Breda’s telephone number is “assigned to a . . . cellular telephone service” under § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) | Breda argued the Republic service is a hybrid that routes calls over cellular networks, so the number is assigned to cellular service | Verizon argued the number was classified as “wireline”/VoIP and that VoIP is not “cellular telephone service” for § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) | Court: Held the hybrid service qualifies as a “cellular telephone service” because calls are routed over cellular networks and the TCPA should be construed broadly for consumer protection |
| Whether exclusive‑VoIP cases govern a hybrid service | Breda: hybrid service is meaningfully different because routing over cellular networks is part of the service | Verizon: VoIP component negates cellular coverage; treating hybrid as cellular would swallow the “charged‑call” catchall | Court: Rejected exclusive‑VoIP analogy; hybrid services that use cellular networks fall within the TCPA’s cellular provision and the charged‑call clause remains applicable to pure‑VoIP services |
| Whether Neustar/Bandwidth classification controls “assigned to” inquiry | Breda: assignment must be assessed by how the number is used and by the service provider (Republic), not by Bandwidth’s Neustar classification | Verizon: Neustar listing as “wireline” shows the number is not assigned to cellular service | Court: Neustar listing is not dispositive; the relevant inquiry is whether the number is being used in connection with cellular service (focus on Republic’s actual routing) |
Key Cases Cited
- Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368 (summarizing TCPA purpose and scope)
- Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190 (test for whether a dispute has its real source in an expired contract)
- United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Unión de Tronquistas de P.R., Local 901, 426 F.3d 470 (application of Litton factors in First Circuit)
- Grand Wireless, Inc. v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 748 F.3d 1 (policy favoring arbitration and related arbitration principles)
- Zimmerman v. Puccio, 613 F.3d 60 (consumer‑protection statutes construed liberally in favor of consumers)
- Alea London Ltd. v. Am. Home Servs., Inc., 638 F.3d 768 (TCPA is strict liability; damages context)
