Breck v. Maryland State Police
156 A.3d 858
| Md. | 2017Background
- Sheila Breck, an MSP sergeant, worked a regular 40‑hour MSP job and, beginning July 2013, averaged three days/month of overtime securing NSA facilities under an MSP–NSA arrangement; MSP paid overtime and was reimbursed by NSA.
- MSP issued a letter (Nov. 2013) and later a directive restricting officers with prior untruthfulness findings from front‑line duties and instructing Breck not to wear uniform or perform law‑enforcement overtime at NSA; MSP investigated her for violating that instruction.
- Breck filed a show‑cause action under the LEOBR alleging MSP unlawfully prohibited her secondary employment under Md. Pub. Safety § 3‑103(b) and later argued MSP’s actions constituted prohibited punitive action under new § 3‑106.1(b).
- The circuit court dismissed; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding Breck’s NSA work was on‑duty overtime (not LEOBR “secondary employment”) and MSP’s action was managerial, not punitive.
- The Court of Appeals granted review and affirmed: “secondary employment” in § 3‑103(b) means off‑duty employment for a third party; on‑duty overtime supervised/paid by the agency (even if reimbursed) is not protected secondary employment; MSP’s reassignment/limitations were managerial, not punitive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether work at NSA was “secondary employment” under § 3‑103(b) | Breck: NSA detail was secondary employment (off‑duty work) protected by LEOBR | MSP: NSA detail was on‑duty, reimbursable overtime (department‑supervised), not "secondary employment" in § 3‑103(b) | Court: Secondary employment means off‑duty work arranged with a third party; MSP–NSA work was on‑duty overtime and not protected |
| Whether MSP’s directive barring Breck from uniformed/overtime NSA work was prohibited punitive action under § 3‑106.1(b) | Breck: Restrictions were punitive and violated § 3‑106.1(b) banning punitive action based on untruthfulness listings | MSP: Restriction was a reasonable management decision to protect prosecutions and agency function, not punishment | Court: Action was managerial (within § 3‑102 authority), not punitive; § 3‑106.1 did not bar such assignment decisions |
Key Cases Cited
- Fields v. State, 432 Md. 650 (2013) (court emphasized disclosure of impeaching officer misconduct can require reversal)
- Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519 (2006) (standard: de novo review for statutory construction)
- Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery Cty. Lodge No. 35 v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155 (1996) (recognizing LEOBR right to secondary employment subject to reasonable regulation)
- Chief, Baltimore County Police Dep’t v. Marchsteiner, 55 Md. App. 108 (1983) (distinguishing managerial reassignments from punitive actions)
- Montgomery County Dep’t of Police v. Lumpkin, 51 Md. App. 557 (1982) (agency transfers for management reasons are non‑punitive)
