Bray v. Husted, 11 F. Supp. 3d 854

Plaintiffs Anna Ruth Bray and Jimmie (Jimmie) Lowe (through administratrix Lois Boone) underwent duodenal switch bariatric surgeries performed by Dr. John Husted in 2009 and suffered severe post‑operative complications including malnutrition and multiple reoperations.
Bray had immediate, severe complications after her May 26, 2009 surgery, spent months in the hospital with three corrective procedures, a medically induced coma, and prolonged disability; she sought additional care and ultimately saw Dr. Jeffrey Allen, who performed exploratory revision surgery on April 6, 2010 and attributed specific surgical errors to Husted.
Lowe’s June 11, 2009 surgery resulted in post‑discharge vomiting/diarrhea and later corrective surgery for a leak; she continued to decline, was treated by multiple facilities, and underwent exploratory revision by Dr. Allen on May 11, 2010, who identified the same problem found in Bray.
Plaintiffs filed this malpractice suit against Husted on February 14, 2011. Husted moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were barred by Kentucky’s one‑year statute of limitations for medical malpractice (K.R.S. § 413.140(1)(e)) because accrual occurred more than one year before filing.
The central legal question is when the one‑year limitations period accrued under Kentucky’s discovery rule — i.e., when plaintiffs knew (or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known) both that they were wronged and who caused the wrong.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Bray’s malpractice claim accrued more than one year before Feb 14, 2011	Bray argues she lacked knowledge of the specific injury/act of malpractice until Dr. Allen’s April 6, 2010 exploratory surgery; earlier symptoms were harm but not proof of malpractice	Husted contends Bray knew she was harmed and by whom shortly after her 2009 surgeries, so limitations began then	Court denied summary judgment — disputed fact whether Bray had knowledge of the injury; jury question.
Whether Lowe’s malpractice claim accrued more than one year before Feb 14, 2011	Lowe (via administratrix) argues she could not know the specific wrongful act until Dr. Allen’s May 11, 2010 exploratory surgery despite early post‑op harm and suspicion	Husted contends that Lowe’s post‑op complaints and statements amounted to knowledge that she was wronged by Husted, starting the limitations period in 2009	Court denied summary judgment — genuine factual dispute about when Lowe knew or should have known; for jury to decide.

Pennington v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 553 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2009) (summary judgment standard)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (genuine dispute vs. one‑sided evidence standard)
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (U.S. 1986) (view evidence in light most favorable to nonmoving party)
Campbell v. Grand Trunk W.R. Co., 238 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2001) (limitations accrual and factual disputes for jury)
Elam v. Menzies, 594 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2010) (court should decide statute‑of‑limitations expiration as a matter of law when possible)
Wiseman v. Alliant Hosps., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 709 (Ky. 2000) (Kentucky discovery rule: must know harm and who caused it; distinction between harm and injury)
Vannoy v. Milum, 171 S.W.3d 745 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005) (knowledge of injury may begin when plaintiff obtains medical records or otherwise has facts attributing harm to treatment)