Brawner Builders v. State Highway Admin., 258 A.3d 217

SHA maintains a plant pre-certification program: manufacturers submit QC plans and inspections to become pre‑approved suppliers for future SHA projects; certification does not obligate SHA to purchase materials.
SHA contracted with Brawner to build noise barriers on I‑95; Brawner subcontracted with Faddis, a SHA‑certified panel manufacturer, to supply panels.
SHA discovered nonconforming aggregate and quality issues at Faddis’s plant and suspended approval of its panels for at least 180 days; SHA communicated problems to Brawner; Faddis then sent letters to SHA and asked Brawner to pass through claims to SHA.
Faddis sued Brawner in federal court (claiming Brawner failed to pass through its SHA claims); later Brawner sent SHA a copy of that complaint (Aug 11, 2015) which SHA accepted as a notice of claim; petitioners appealed to the MSBCA in Sept. 2018 when SHA did not issue a decision.
MSBCA granted SHA summary disposition: (1) certification of Faddis as a pre‑approved supplier did not create a procurement contract with SHA, so Faddis lacked standing to sue SHA directly; (2) Brawner’s pass‑through notice was untimely because Faddis and Brawner knew of the claim by June 23, 2014 and notice was not given within 30 days.
The Circuit Court reversed; the Court of Special Appeals and Court of Appeals affirmed MSBCA, holding no procurement contract existed and the pass‑through notice was untimely.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether SHA’s pre‑approval/certification of Faddis created a "procurement contract" allowing Faddis to file a direct procurement claim against the State	Faddis: SHA’s written approvals (mix designs, QC plan, plant certification) amounted to a procurement contract, waiving sovereign immunity and granting direct standing	SHA: Certification only grants eligibility; no written procurement contract or procurement officer award existed, so sovereign immunity bars direct suit	Held: Certification alone is not a procurement contract; no waiver of sovereign immunity; Faddis lacked standing to sue SHA directly
Whether Brawner timely filed a pass‑through notice of claim for Faddis and whether equitable estoppel/preclusion of summary disposition applies	Brawner/Faddis: knowledge when claim accrued is factual; MSBCA erred by deciding timeliness on summary disposition; equitable estoppel applies because SHA acknowledged an administrative dispute	SHA: Undisputed facts (e.g., Faddis’s June 23, 2014 letter) show claim basis known by June 23, 2014 so pass‑through notice required within 30 days; Brawner’s Aug 11, 2015 notice was untimely; June 19 emails related to plant certification process not a waiver of notice	Held: Timeliness is decided as a matter of law on these undisputed facts; pass‑through notice was untimely; equitable estoppel/summary disposition arguments fail on the record

Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Pollard, 466 Md. 531 (2019) (standard of review for administrative decisions)
Rosello v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 468 Md. 92 (2020) (summary judgment standards reviewed de novo)
Engineering Mgmt. Servs. v. Maryland State Highway Admin., 375 Md. 211 (2003) (summary disposition may be inappropriate when factual development about knowledge, intent, or motive is required)
Proctor v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 412 Md. 691 (2010) (waivers of sovereign immunity strictly construed)
Clea v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662 (1988) (summary judgment inappropriate only if facts permit inferences supporting non‑movant)
Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302 (1980) (factual issues involving intent or motive often require fuller development)